the+critique+of+practical+reason-第15部分

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poverty　of　language；　in　consequence　of　which　they　admit　a　double
sense；　and；　therefore；　inevitably　bring　the　practical　laws　into
ambiguity；　and　philosophy；　which　in　employing　them　bees　aware　of
the　different　meanings　in　the　same　word；　but　can　find　no　special
expressions　for　them；　is　driven　to　subtile　distinctions　about　which
there　is　subsequently　no　unanimity；　because　the　distinction　could
not　be　directly　marked　by　any　suitable　expression。*

　　*Besides　this；　the　expression　sub　ratione　boni　is　also　ambiguous。
For　it　may　mean：　〃We　represent　something　to　ourselves　as　good；　when
and　because　we　desire　（will）　it〃；　or　〃We　desire　something　because　we
represent　it　to　ourselves　as　good；〃　so　that　either　the　desire
determines　the　notion　of　the　object　as　a　good；　or　the　notion　of　good
determines　the　desire　（the　will）；　so　that　in　the　first　case　sub
ratione　boni　would　mean；　〃We　will　something　under　the　idea　of　the
good〃；　in　the　second；　〃In　consequence　of　this　idea；〃　which；　as
determining　the　volition；　must　precede　it。

　　The　German　language　has　the　good　fortune　to　possess　expressions
which　do　not　allow　this　difference　to　be　overlooked。　It　possesses
two　very　distinct　concepts　and　especially　distinct　expressions　for
that　which　the　Latins　express　by　a　single　word；　bonum。　For　bonum　it
has　das　Gute　＇good＇；　and　das　Wohl　＇well；　weal＇；　for　malum　das　Bose
＇evil＇；　and　das　Ubel　＇ill；　bad＇；　or　das　Well　＇woe＇。　So　that　we　express
two　quite　distinct　judgements　when　we　consider　in　an　action　the　good
and　evil　of　it；　or　our　weal　and　woe　（ill）。　Hence　it　already　follows
that　the　above　quoted　psychological　proposition　is　at　least　very
doubtful　if　it　is　translated：　〃We　desire　nothing　except　with　a　view　to
our　weal　or　woe〃；　on　the　other　hand；　if　we　render　it　thus：　〃Under
the　direction　of　reason　we　desire　nothing　except　so　far　as　we　esteem
it　good　or　evil；〃　it　is　indubitably　certain　and　at　the　same　time　quite
clearly　expressed。
　　Well　or　ill　always　implies　only　a　reference　to　our　condition；　as
pleasant　or　unpleasant；　as　one　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　if　we　desire
or　avoid　an　object　on　this　account；　it　is　only　so　far　as　it　is
referred　to　our　sensibility　and　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain
that　it　produces。　But　good　or　evil　always　implies　a　reference　to　the
will；　as　determined　by　the　law　of　reason；　to　make　something　its
object；　for　it　is　never　determined　directly　by　the　object　and　the　idea
of　it；　but　is　a　faculty　of　taking　a　rule　of　reason　for　or　motive　of　an
action　（by　which　an　object　may　be　realized）。　Good　and　evil　therefore
are　properly　referred　to　actions；　not　to　the　sensations　of　the　person；
and　if　anything　is　to　be　good　or　evil　absolutely　（i。e。；　in　every
respect　and　without　any　further　condition）；　or　is　to　be　so　esteemed；
it　can　only　be　the　manner　of　acting；　the　maxim　of　the　will；　and
consequently　the　acting　person　himself　as　a　good　or　evil　man　that
can　be　so　called；　and　not　a　thing。
　　However；　then；　men　may　laugh　at　the　Stoic；　who　in　the　severest
paroxysms　of　gout　cried　out：　〃Pain；　however　thou　tormentest　me；　I　will
never　admit　that　thou　art　an　evil　（kakov；　malum）〃：　he　was　right。　A　bad
thing　it　certainly　was；　and　his　cry　betrayed　that；　but　that　any　evil
attached　to　him　thereby；　this　he　bad　no　reason　whatever　to　admit；
for　pain　did　not　in　the　least　diminish　the　worth　of　his　person；　but
only　that　of　his　condition。　If　he　had　been　conscious　of　a　single
lie；　it　would　have　lowered　his　pride；　but　pain　served　only　to　raise
it；　when　he　was　conscious　that　he　had　not　deserved　it　by　any
unrighteous　action　by　which　he　had　rendered　himself　worthy　of
punishment。
　　What　we　call　good　must　be　an　object　of　desire　in　the　judgement　of
every　rational　man；　and　evil　an　object　of　aversion　in　the　eyes　of
everyone；　therefore；　in　addition　to　sense；　this　judgement　requires
reason。　So　it　is　with　truthfulness；　as　opposed　to　lying；　so　with
justice；　as　opposed　to　violence；　&c。　But　we　may　call　a　thing　a　bad　＇or
ill）　thing；　which　yet　everyone　must　at　the　same　time　acknowledge　to　be
good；　sometimes　directly；　sometimes　indirectly。　The　man　who　submits　to
a　surgical　operation　feels　it　no　doubt　as　a　bad　thing；　but　by　their
reason　he　and　everyone　acknowledge　it　to　be　good。　If　a　man　who
delights　in　annoying　and　vexing　peaceable　people　at　last　receives　a
right　good　beating；　this　is　no　doubt　a　bad　thing；　but　everyone
approves　it　and　regards　it　as　a　good　thing；　even　though　nothing　else
resulted　from　it；　nay；　even　the　man　who　receives　it　must　in　his　reason
acknowledge　that　he　has　met　justice；　because　he　sees　the　proportion
between　good　conduct　and　good　fortune；　which　reason　inevitably
places　before　him；　here　put　into　practice。
　　No　doubt　our　weal　and　woe　are　of　very　great　importance　in　the
estimation　of　our　practical　reason；　and　as　far　as　our　nature　as
sensible　beings　is　concerned；　our　happiness　is　the　only　thing　of
consequence；　provided　it　is　estimated　as　reason　especially　requires；
not　by　the　transitory　sensation；　but　by　the　influence　that　this　has　on
our　whole　existence；　and　on　our　satisfaction　therewith；　but　it　is
not　absolutely　the　only　thing　of　consequence。　Man　is　a　being　who；　as
belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　has　wants；　and　so　far　his　reason
has　an　office　which　it　cannot　refuse；　namely；　to　attend　to　the
interest　of　his　sensible　nature；　and　to　form　practical　maxims；　even
with　a　view　to　the　happiness　of　this　life；　and　if　possible　even　to
that　of　a　future。　But　he　is　not　so　pletely　an　animal　as　to　be
indifferent　to　what　reason　says　on　its　own　account；　and　to　use　it
merely　as　an　instrument　for　the　satisfaction　of　his　wants　as　a
sensible　being。　For　the　possession　of　reason　would　not　raise　his　worth
above　that　of　the　brutes；　if　it　is　to　serve　him　only　for　the　same
purpose　that　instinct　serves　in　them；　it　would　in　that　case　be　only
a　particular　method　which　nature　had　employed　to　equip　man　for　the
same　ends　for　which　it　has　qualified　brutes；　without　qualifying　him
for　any　higher　purpose。　No　doubt　once　this　arrangement　of　nature　has
been　made　for　him　he　requires　reason　in　order　to　take　into
consideration　his　weal　and　woe；　but　besides　this　he　possesses　it　for　a
higher　purpose　also；　namely；　not　only　to　take　into　consideration
what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　about　which　only　pure　reason；
uninfluenced　by　any　sensible　interest；　can　judge；　but　also　to
distinguish　this　estimate　thoroughly　from　the　former　and　to　make　it
the　supreme　condition　thereof。
　　In　estimating　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　as　distinguished
from　what　can　be　so　called　only　relatively；　the　following　points　are
to　be　considered。　Either　a　rational　principle　is　already　conceived；　as
of　itself　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　without　regard　to
possible　objects　of　desire　（and　therefore　by　the　more　legislative　form
of　the　maxim）；　and　in　that　case　that　principle　is　a　practical　a　priori
law；　and　pure　reason　is　supposed　to　be　practical　of　itself。　The　law　in
that　case　determines　the　will　directly；　the　action　conformed　to　it
is　good　in　itself；　a　will　whose　maxim　always　conforms　to　this　law　is
good　absolutely　in　every　respect　and　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all
good。　Or　the　maxim　of　the　will　is　consequent　on　a　determining
principle　of　desire　which　presupposes　an　object　of　pleasure　or　pain；
something　therefore　that　pleases　or　displeases；　and　the　maxim　of
reason　that　we　should　pursue　the　former　and　avoid　the　latter
determines　our　actions　as　good　relatively　to　our　inclination；　that　is；
good　indirectly；　i。e。；　relatively　to　a　different　end　to　which　they　are
means）；　and　in　that　case　these　maxims　can　never　be　called　laws；　but
may　be　called　rational　practical　precepts。　The　end　itself；　the
pleasure　that　we　seek；　is　in　the　latter　case　not　a　good　but　a　welfare；
not　a　concept　of　reason；　but　an　empirical　concept　of　an　object　of
sensation；　but　the　use　of　the　means　thereto；　that　is；　the　action；　is
nevertheless　called　good　（because　rational　deliberation　is　required
for　it）；　not　however；　good　absolutely；　but　only　relatively　to　our
sensuous　nature；　with　regard　to　its　feelings　of　pleasure　and
displeasure；　but　the　will　whose　maxim　is　affected　thereby　is　not　a
pure　will；　this　is　directed　only　to　that　in　which　pure　reason　by
itself　can　be　practical。
　　This　is　the　proper　place　to　explain　the　paradox　of　method　in　a
critique　of　practical　reason；　namely；　that　the　concept　of　good　and
evil　must　not　be　determined　before　the　moral　law　（of　which　it　seems　as
if　it　must　be　the　foundation）；　but　only　after　it　and　by　means　of　it。
In　fact；　even　if　we　did　not　know　that　the　principle　of　morality　is　a
pure　a　priori　law　determining　the　will；　yet；　that　we　may　not　assume
principles　quite　gratuitously；　we　must；　at　least　at　first；　leave　it
undecided；　whether　the　will　has　merely　empirical　principles　of
determination；　or　whether　it　has　not　also　pure　a　priori　principles；
for　it　is　contrary　to　all　rules　of　philosophical　method　to　assume　as
decided　that　which　is　the　very　point　in　question。　Supposing　that　we
wished　to　begin　with　the　concept　of　good；　in　order　to　deduce　from　it
the　laws　of　the　will；　then　this　concept　of　an　object　（as　a　good）　would
at　the　same　time　assign　to　us　this　object　as　the　sole　determining
principle　of　the　will。　Now；　since　this　concept　had　not　any　p