the+critique+of+practical+reason-第19部分

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participation　in　the　supreme　legislation。　This　effect　is　on　one　side
merely　negative；　but　on　the　other　side；　relatively　to　the
restricting　principle　of　pure　practical　reason；　it　is　positive。　No
special　kind　of　feeling　need　be　assumed　for　this　under　the　name　of　a
practical　or　moral　feeling　as　antecedent　to　the　moral　law　and
serving　as　its　foundation。
　　The　negative　effect　on　feeling　（unpleasantness）　is　pathological；
like　every　influence　on　feeling　and　like　every　feeling　generally。
But　as　an　effect　of　the　consciousness　of　the　moral　law；　and
consequently　in　relation　to　a　supersensible　cause；　namely；　the　subject
of　pure　practical　reason　which　is　the　supreme　lawgiver；　this　feeling
of　a　rational　being　affected　by　inclinations　is　called　humiliation
（intellectual　self…depreciation）；　but　with　reference　to　the　positive
source　of　this　humiliation；　the　law；　it　is　respect　for　it。　There　is
indeed　no　feeling　for　this　law；　but　inasmuch　as　it　removes　the
resistance　out　of　the　way；　this　removal　of　an　obstacle　is；　in　the
judgement　of　reason；　esteemed　equivalent　to　a　positive　help　to　its
causality。　Therefore　this　feeling　may　also　be　called　a　feeling　of
respect　for　the　moral　law；　and　for　both　reasons　together　a　moral
feeling。
　　While　the　moral　law；　therefore；　is　a　formal　determining　principle　of
action　by　practical　pure　reason；　and　is　moreover　a　material　though
only　objective　determining　principle　of　the　objects　of　action　as
called　good　and　evil；　it　is　also　a　subjective　determining　principle；
that　is；　a　motive　to　this　action；　inasmuch　as　it　has　influence　on
the　morality　of　the　subject　and　produces　a　feeling　conducive　to　the
influence　of　the　law　on　the　will。　There　is　here　in　the　subject　no
antecedent　feeling　tending　to　morality。　For　this　is　impossible；
since　every　feeling　is　sensible；　and　the　motive　of　moral　intention
must　be　free　from　all　sensible　conditions。　On　the　contrary；　while
the　sensible　feeling　which　is　at　the　bottom　of　all　our　inclinations　is
the　condition　of　that　impression　which　we　call　respect；　the　cause　that
determines　it　lies　in　the　pure　practical　reason；　and　this　impression
therefore；　on　account　of　its　origin；　must　be　called；　not　a
pathological　but　a　practical　effect。　For　by　the　fact　that　the
conception　of　the　moral　law　deprives　self…love　of　its　influence；　and
self…conceit　of　its　illusion；　it　lessens　the　obstacle　to　pure
practical　reason　and　produces　the　conception　of　the　superiority　of　its
objective　law　to　the　impulses　of　the　sensibility；　and　thus；　by
removing　the　counterpoise；　it　gives　relatively　greater　weight　to　the
law　in　the　judgement　of　reason　（in　the　case　of　a　will　affected　by
the　aforesaid　impulses）。　Thus　the　respect　for　the　law　is　not　a
motive　to　morality；　but　is　morality　itself　subjectively　considered
as　a　motive；　inasmuch　as　pure　practical　reason；　by　rejecting　all　the
rival　pretensions　of　selflove；　gives　authority　to　the　law；　which　now
alone　has　influence。　Now　it　is　to　be　observed　that　as　respect　is　an
effect　on　feeling；　and　therefore　on　the　sensibility；　of　a　rational
being；　it　presupposes　this　sensibility；　and　therefore　also　the
finiteness　of　such　beings　on　whom　the　moral　law　imposes　respect；　and
that　respect　for　the　law　cannot　be　attributed　to　a　supreme　being；　or
to　any　being　free　from　all　sensibility；　in　whom；　therefore；　this
sensibility　cannot　be　an　obstacle　to　practical　reason。
　　This　feeling　（which　we　call　the　moral　feeling）　is　therefore　produced
simply　by　reason。　It　does　not　serve　for　the　estimation　of　actions
nor　for　the　foundation　of　the　objective　moral　law　itself；　but　merely
as　a　motive　to　make　this　of　itself　a　maxim。　But　what　name　could　we
more　suitably　apply　to　this　singular　feeling　which　cannot　be
pared　to　any　pathological　feeling？　It　is　of　such　a　peculiar　kind
that　it　seems　to　be　at　the　disposal　of　reason　only；　and　that　pure
practical　reason。
　　Respect　applies　always　to　persons　only…　not　to　things。　The　latter
may　arouse　inclination；　and　if　they　are　animals　（e。g。；　horses；　dogs；
etc。）；　even　love　or　fear；　like　the　sea；　a　volcano；　a　beast　of　prey；
but　never　respect。　Something　that　es　nearer　to　this　feeling　is
admiration；　and　this；　as　an　affection；　astonishment；　can　apply　to
things　also；　e。g。；　lofty　mountains；　the　magnitude；　number；　and
distance　of　the　heavenly　bodies；　the　strength　and　swiftness　of　many
animals；　etc。　But　all　this　is　not　respect。　A　man　also　may　be　an　object
to　me　of　love；　fear；　or　admiration；　even　to　astonishment；　and　yet
not　be　an　object　of　respect。　His　jocose　humour；　his　courage　and
strength；　his　power　from　the　rank　be　has　amongst　others；　may　inspire
me　with　sentiments　of　this　kind；　but　still　inner　respect　for　him　is
wanting。　Fontenelle　says；　〃I　bow　before　a　great　man；　but　my　mind
does　not　bow。〃　I　would　add；　before　an　humble　plain　man；　in　whom　I
perceive　uprightness　of　character　in　a　higher　degree　than　I　am
conscious　of　in　myself；…　my　mind　bows　whether　I　choose　it　or　not；
and　though　I　bear　my　head　never　so　high　that　he　may　not　forget　my
superior　rank。　Why　is　this？　Because　his　example　exhibits　to　me　a　law
that　humbles　my　self…conceit　when　I　pare　it　with　my　conduct：　a　law；
the　practicability　of　obedience　to　which　I　see　proved　by　fact　before
my　eyes。　Now；　I　may　even　be　conscious　of　a　like　degree　of　uprightness；
and　yet　the　respect　remains。　For　since　in　man　all　good　is　defective；
the　law　made　visible　by　an　example　still　humbles　my　pride；　my　standard
being　furnished　by　a　man　whose　imperfections；　whatever　they　may　be；
are　not　known　to　me　as　my　own　are；　and　who　therefore　appears　to　me
in　a　more　favourable　light。　Respect　is　a　tribute　which　we　cannot
refuse　to　merit；　whether　we　will　or　not；　we　may　indeed　outwardly
withhold　it；　but　we　cannot　help　feeling　it　inwardly。
　　Respect　is　so　far　from　being　a　feeling　of　pleasure　that　we　only
reluctantly　give　way　to　it　as　regards　a　man。　We　try　to　find　out
something　that　may　lighten　the　burden　of　it；　some　fault　to
pensate　us　for　the　humiliation　which　such　which　such　an　example
causes。　Even　the　dead　are　not　always　secure　from　this　criticism；
especially　if　their　example　appears　inimitable。　Even　the　moral　law
itself　in　its　solemn　majesty　is　exposed　to　this　endeavour　to　save
oneself　from　yielding　it　respect。　Can　it　be　thought　that　it　is　for　any
other　reason　that　we　are　so　ready　to　reduce　it　to　the　level　of　our
familiar　inclination；　or　that　it　is　for　any　other　reason　that　we　all
take　such　trouble　to　make　it　out　to　be　the　chosen　precept　of　our　own
interest　well　understood；　but　that　we　want　to　be　free　from　the
deterrent　respect　which　shows　us　our　own　unworthiness　with　such
severity？　Nevertheless；　on　the　other　hand；　so　little　is　there　pain
in　it　that　if　once　one　has　laid　aside　self…conceit　and　allowed
practical　influence　to　that　respect；　he　can　never　be　satisfied　with
contemplating　the　majesty　of　this　law；　and　the　soul　believes　itself
elevated　in　proportion　as　it　sees　the　holy　law　elevated　above　it　and
its　frail　nature。　No　doubt　great　talents　and　activity　proportioned
to　them　may　also　occasion　respect　or　an　analogous　feeling。　It　is
very　proper　to　yield　it　to　them；　and　then　it　appears　as　if　this
sentiment　were　the　same　thing　as　admiration。　But　if　we　look　closer
we　shall　observe　that　it　is　always　uncertain　how　much　of　the　ability
is　due　to　native　talent；　and　how　much　to　diligence　in　cultivating
it。　Reason　represents　it　to　us　as　probably　the　fruit　of　cultivation；
and　therefore　as　meritorious；　and　this　notably　reduces　our
self…conceit；　and　either　casts　a　reproach　on　us　or　urges　us　to
follow　such　an　example　in　the　way　that　is　suitable　to　us。　This
respect；　then；　which　we　show　to　such　a　person　（properly　speaking；　to
the　law　that　his　example　exhibits）　is　not　mere　admiration；　and　this　is
confirmed　also　by　the　fact　that　when　the　mon　run　of　admirers
think　they　have　learned　from　any　source　the　badness　of　such　a　man's
character　（for　instance　Voltaire's）　they　give　up　all　respect　for
him；　whereas　the　true　scholar　still　feels　it　at　least　with　regard　to
his　talents；　because　he　is　himself　engaged　in　a　business　and　a
vocation　which　make　imitation　of　such　a　man　in　some　degree　a　law。
　　Respect　for　the　moral　law　is；　therefore；　the　only　and　the
undoubted　moral　motive；　and　this　feeling　is　directed　to　no　object；
except　on　the　ground　of　this　law。　The　moral　law　first　determines　the
will　objectively　and　directly　in　the　judgement　of　reason；　and　freedom；
whose　causality　can　be　determined　only　by　the　law；　consists　just　in
this；　that　it　restricts　all　inclinations；　and　consequently
self…esteem；　by　the　condition　of　obedience　to　its　pure　law。　This
restriction　now　has　an　effect　on　feeling；　and　produces　the
impression　of　displeasure　which　can　be　known　a　priori　from　the　moral
law。　Since　it　is　so　far　only　a　negative　effect　which；　arising　from　the
influence　of　pure　practical　reason；　checks　the　activity　of　the
subject；　so　far　as　it　is　determined　by　inclinations；　and　hence
checks　the　opinion　of　his　personal　worth　（which；　in　the　absence　of
agreement　with　the　moral　law；　is　reduced　to　nothing）；　hence；　the
effect　of　this　law　on　feeling　is　merely　humiliation。　We　can；
therefore；　perceive　this　a　priori；　but　cannot　know　by　it　the　force
of　the　pure　practical　law　as　a　motive；　but　only　the　resistance