the+critique+of+practical+reason-第20部分

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of　the　pure　practical　law　as　a　motive；　but　only　the　resistance　to
motives　of　the　sensibility。　But　since　the　same　law　is　objectively；
that　is；　in　the　conception　of　pure　reason；　an　immediate　principle　of
determination　of　the　will；　and　consequently　this　humiliation　takes
place　only　relatively　to　the　purity　of　the　law；　hence；　the　lowering　of
the　pretensions　of　moral　self…esteem；　that　is；　humiliation　on　the
sensible　side；　is　an　elevation　of　the　moral；　i。e。；　practical；　esteem
for　the　law　itself　on　the　intellectual　side；　in　a　word；　it　is
respect　for　the　law；　and　therefore；　as　its　cause　is　intellectual；　a
positive　feeling　which　can　be　known　a　priori。　For　whatever
diminishes　the　obstacles　to　an　activity　furthers　this　activity　itself。
Now　the　recognition　of　the　moral　law　is　the　consciousness　of　an
activity　of　practical　reason　from　objective　principles；　which　only
fails　to　reveal　its　effect　in　actions　because　subjective
（pathological）　causes　hinder　it。　Respect　for　the　moral　law　then　must
be　regarded　as　a　positive；　though　indirect；　effect　of　it　on　feeling；
inasmuch　as　this　respect　weakens　the　impeding　influence　of
inclinations　by　humiliating　selfesteem；　and　hence　also　as　a　subjective
principle　of　activity；　that　is；　as　a　motive　to　obedience　to　the　law；
and　as　a　principle　of　the　maxims　of　a　life　conformable　to　it。　From　the
notion　of　a　motive　arises　that　of　an　interest；　which　can　never　be
attributed　to　any　being　unless　it　possesses　reason；　and　which
signifies　a　motive　of　the　will　in　so　far　as　it　is　conceived　by　the
reason。　Since　in　a　morally　good　will　the　law　itself　must　be　the
motive；　the　moral　interest　is　a　pure　interest　of　practical　reason
alone；　independent　of　sense。　On　the　notion　of　an　interest　is　based
that　of　a　maxim。　This；　therefore；　is　morally　good　only　in　case　it
rests　simply　on　the　interest　taken　in　obedience　to　the　law。　All
three　notions；　however；　that　of　a　motive；　of　an　interest；　and　of　a
maxim；　can　be　applied　only　to　finite　beings。　For　they　all　suppose　a
limitation　of　the　nature　of　the　being；　in　that　the　subjective
character　of　his　choice　does　not　of　itself　agree　with　the　objective
law　of　a　practical　reason；　they　suppose　that　the　being　requires　to
be　impelled　to　action　by　something；　because　an　internal　obstacle
opposes　itself。　Therefore　they　cannot　be　applied　to　the　Divine　will。
　　There　is　something　so　singular　in　the　unbounded　esteem　for　the
pure　moral　law；　apart　from　all　advantage；　as　it　is　presented　for　our
obedience　by　practical　reason；　the　voice　of　which　makes　even　the
boldest　sinner　tremble　and　pels　him　to　hide　himself　from　it；　that
we　cannot　wonder　if　we　find　this　influence　of　a　mere　intellectual　idea
on　the　feelings　quite　inprehensible　to　speculative　reason　and
have　to　be　satisfied　with　seeing　so　much　of　this　a　priori　that　such
a　feeling　is　inseparably　connected　with　the　conception　of　the　moral
law　in　every　finite　rational　being。　If　this　feeling　of　respect　were
pathological；　and　therefore　were　a　feeling　of　pleasure　based　on　the
inner　sense；　it　would　be　in　vain　to　try　to　discover　a　connection　of　it
with　any　idea　a　priori。　But　＇it＇　is　a　feeling　that　applies　merely　to
what　is　practical；　and　depends　on　the　conception　of　a　law；　simply　as
to　its　form；　not　on　account　of　any　object；　and　therefore　cannot　be
reckoned　either　as　pleasure　or　pain；　and　yet　produces　an　interest　in
obedience　to　the　law；　which　we　call　the　moral　interest；　just　as　the
capacity　of　taking　such　an　interest　in　the　law　（or　respect　for　the
moral　law　itself）　is　properly　the　moral　feeling。
　　The　consciousness　of　a　free　submission　of　the　will　to　the　law；　yet
bined　with　an　inevitable　constraint　put　upon　all　inclinations；
though　only　by　our　own　reason；　is　respect　for　the　law。　The　law　that
demands　this　respect　and　inspires　it　is　clearly　no　other　than　the
moral　（for　no　other　precludes　all　inclinations　from　exercising　any
direct　influence　on　the　will）。　An　action　which　is　objectively
practical　according　to　this　law；　to　the　exclusion　of　every　determining
principle　of　inclination；　is　duty；　and　this　by　reason　of　that
exclusion　includes　in　its　concept　practical　obligation；　that　is；　a
determination　to　actions；　however　reluctantly　they　may　be　done。　The
feeling　that　arises　from　the　consciousness　of　this　obligation　is　not
pathological；　as　would　be　a　feeling　produced　by　an　object　of　the
senses；　but　practical　only；　that　is；　it　is　made　possible　by　a
preceding　（objective）　determination　of　the　will　and　a　causality　of　the
reason。　As　submission　to　the　law；　therefore；　that　is；　as　a　mand
（announcing　constraint　for　the　sensibly　affected　subject）；　it　contains
in　it　no　pleasure；　but　on　the　contrary；　so　far；　pain　in　the　action。　On
the　other　hand；　however；　as　this　constraint　is　exercised　merely　by　the
legislation　of　our　own　reason；　it　also　contains　something　elevating；
and　this　subjective　effect　on　feeling；　inasmuch　as　pure　practical
reason　is　the　sole　cause　of　it；　may　be　called　in　this　respect
self…approbation；　since　we　recognize　ourselves　as　determined　thereto
solely　by　the　law　without　any　interest；　and　are　now　conscious　of　a
quite　different　interest　subjectively　produced　thereby；　and　which　is
purely　practical　and　free；　and　our　taking　this　interest　in　an　action
of　duty　is　not　suggested　by　any　inclination；　but　is　manded　and
actually　brought　about　by　reason　through　the　practical　law；　whence
this　feeling　obtains　a　special　name；　that　of　respect。
　　The　notion　of　duty；　therefore；　requires　in　the　action；
objectively；　agreement　with　the　law；　and；　subjectively　in　its　maxim；
that　respect　for　the　law　shall　be　the　sole　mode　in　which　the　will　is
determined　thereby。　And　on　this　rests　the　distinction　between　the
consciousness　of　having　acted　according　to　duty　and　from　duty；　that
is；　from　respect　for　the　law。　The　former　（legality）　is　possible　even
if　inclinations　have　been　the　determining　principles　of　the　will；
but　the　latter　（morality）；　moral　worth；　can　be　placed　only　in　this；
that　the　action　is　done　from　duty；　that　is；　simply　for　the　sake　of　the
law。*

　　*If　we　examine　accurately　the　notion　of　respect　for　persons　as　it
has　been　already　laid　down；　we　shall　perceive　that　it　always　rests
on　the　consciousness　of　a　duty　which　an　example　shows　us；　and　that
respect；　therefore。　can　never　have　any　but　a　moral　ground；　and　that　it
is　very　good　and　even；　in　a　psychological　point　of　view；　very　useful
for　the　knowledge　of　mankind；　that　whenever　we　use　this　expression
we　should　attend　to　this　secret　and　marvellous；　yet　often　recurring；
regard　which　men　in　their　judgement　pay　to　the　moral　law。

　　It　is　of　the　greatest　importance　to　attend　with　the　utmost　exactness
in　all　moral　judgements　to　the　subjective　principle　of　all　maxims；
that　all　the　morality　of　actions　may　be　placed　in　the　necessity　of
acting　from　duty　and　from　respect　for　the　law；　not　from　love　and
inclination　for　that　which　the　actions　are　to　produce。　For　men　and　all
created　rational　beings　moral　necessity　is　constraint；　that　is
obligation；　and　every　action　based　on　it　is　to　be　conceived　as　a　duty；
not　as　a　proceeding　previously　pleasing；　or　likely　to　be　Pleasing　to
us　of　our　own　accord。　As　if　indeed　we　could　ever　bring　it　about　that
without　respect　for　the　law；　which　implies　fear；　or　at　least
apprehension　of　transgression；　we　of　ourselves；　like　the　independent
Deity；　could　ever　e　into　possession　of　holiness　of　will　by　the
coincidence　of　our　will　with　the　pure　moral　law　being　as　it　were
part　of　our　nature；　never　to　be　shaken　（in　which　case　the　law　would
cease　to　be　a　mand　for　us；　as　we　could　never　be　tempted　to　be
untrue　to　it）。
　　The　moral　law　is　in　fact　for　the　will　of　a　perfect　being　a　law　of
holiness；　but　for　the　will　of　every　finite　rational　being　a　law　of
duty；　of　moral　constraint；　and　of　the　determination　of　its　actions
by　respect　for　this　law　and　reverence　for　its　duty。　No　other
subjective　principle　must　be　assumed　as　a　motive；　else　while　the
action　might　chance　to　be　such　as　the　law　prescribes；　yet；　as　does　not
proceed　from　duty；　the　intention；　which　is　the　thing　properly　in
question　in　this　legislation；　is　not　moral。
　　It　is　a　very　beautiful　thing　to　do　good　to　men　from　love　to　them　and
from　sympathetic　good　will；　or　to　be　just　from　love　of　order；　but　this
is　not　yet　the　true　moral　maxim　of　our　conduct　which　is　suitable　to
our　position　amongst　rational　beings　as　men；　when　we　pretend　with
fanciful　pride　to　set　ourselves　above　the　thought　of　duty；　like
volunteers；　and；　as　if　we　were　independent　on　the　mand；　to　want
to　do　of　our　own　good　pleasure　what　we　think　we　need　no　mand　to　do。
We　stand　under　a　discipline　of　reason　and　in　all　our　maxims　must　not
forget　our　subjection　to　it；　nor　withdraw　anything　therefrom；　or　by　an
egotistic　presumption　diminish　aught　of　the　authority　of　the　law
（although　our　own　reason　gives　it）　so　as　to　set　the　determining
principle　of　our　will；　even　though　the　law　be　conformed　to；　anywhere
else　but　in　the　law　itself　and　in　respect　for　this　law。　Duty　and
obligation　are　the　only　names　that　we　must　give　to　our　relation　to　the
moral　law。　We　are　indeed　legislative　members　of　a　moral　kingdom
rendered　possible　by　freedom；　and　presented　to　us　by　reason　as　an
object　of　respect；　but　yet　we　are　subjects　in　it