the+critique+of+practical+reason-第22部分

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only　worth　which　men　can　give　themselves？
　　It　can　be　nothing　less　than　a　power　which　elevates　man　above　himself
（as　a　part　of　the　world　of　sense）；　a　power　which　connects　him　with
an　order　of　things　that　only　the　understanding　can　conceive；　with　a
world　which　at　the　same　time　mands　the　whole　sensible　world；　and
with　it　the　empirically　determinable　existence　of　man　in　time；　as　well
as　the　sum　total　of　all　ends　（which　totality　alone　suits　such
unconditional　practical　laws　as　the　moral）。　This　power　is　nothing
but　personality；　that　is；　freedom　and　independence　on　the　mechanism　of
nature；　yet；　regarded　also　as　a　faculty　of　a　being　which　is　subject　to
special　laws；　namely；　pure　practical　laws　given　by　its　own　reason；
so　that　the　person　as　belonging　to　the　sensible　world　is　subject　to
his　own　personality　as　belonging　to　the　intelligible　＇supersensible＇
world。　It　is　then　not　to　be　wondered　at　that　man；　as　belonging　to　both
worlds；　must　regard　his　own　nature　in　reference　to　its　second　and
highest　characteristic　only　with　reverence；　and　its　laws　with　the
highest　respect。
　　On　this　origin　are　founded　many　expressions　which　designate　the
worth　of　objects　according　to　moral　ideas。　The　moral　law　is　holy
（inviolable）。　Man　is　indeed　unholy　enough；　but　he　must　regard　humanity
in　his　own　person　as　holy。　In　all　creation　every　thing　one　chooses　and
over　which　one　has　any　power；　may　be　used　merely　as　means；　man
alone；　and　with　him　every　rational　creature；　is　an　end　in　himself。
By　virtue　of　the　autonomy　of　his　freedom　he　is　the　subject　of　the
moral　law；　which　is　holy。　just　for　this　reason　every　will；　even
every　person's　own　individual　will；　in　relation　to　itself；　is
restricted　to　the　condition　of　agreement　with　the　autonomy　of　the
rational　being；　that　is　to　say；　that　it　is　not　to　be　subject　to　any
purpose　which　cannot　accord　with　a　law　which　might　arise　from　the　will
of　the　passive　subject　himself；　the　latter　is；　therefore；　never　to
be　employed　merely　as　means；　but　as　itself　also；　concurrently；　an　end。
We　justly　attribute　this　condition　even　to　the　Divine　will；　with
regard　to　the　rational　beings　in　the　world；　which　are　His　creatures；
since　it　rests　on　their　personality；　by　which　alone　they　are　ends　in
themselves。
　　This　respect…inspiring　idea　of　personality　which　sets　before　our
eyes　the　sublimity　of　our　nature　（in　its　higher　aspect）；　while　at
the　same　time　it　shows　us　the　want　of　accord　of　our　conduct　with　it
and　thereby　strikes　down　self…conceit；　is　even　natural　to　the
monest　reason　and　easily　observed。　Has　not　every　even　moderately
honourable　man　sometimes　found　that；　where　by　an　otherwise　inoffensive
lie　he　might　either　have　withdrawn　himself　from　an　unpleasant
business；　or　even　have　procured　some　advantages　for　a　loved　and
well…deserving　friend；　he　has　avoided　it　solely　lest　he　should　despise
himself　secretly　in　his　own　eyes？　When　an　upright　man　is　in　the
greatest　distress；　which　he　might　have　avoided　if　he　could　only　have
disregarded　duty；　is　he　not　sustained　by　the　consciousness　that　he　has
maintained　humanity　in　its　proper　dignity　in　his　own　person　and
honoured　it；　that　he　has　no　reason　to　be　ashamed　of　himself　in　his　own
sight；　or　to　dread　the　inward　glance　of　self…examination？　This
consolation　is　not　happiness；　it　is　not　even　the　smallest　part　of
it；　for　no　one　would　wish　to　have　occasion　for　it；　or　would；
perhaps；　even　desire　a　life　in　such　circumstances。　But　he　lives；　and
he　cannot　endure　that　he　should　be　in　his　own　eyes　unworthy　of　life。
This　inward　peace　is　therefore　merely　negative　as　regards　what　can
make　life　pleasant；　it　is；　in　fact；　only　the　escaping　the　danger　of
sinking　in　personal　worth；　after　everything　else　that　is　valuable
has　been　lost。　It　is　the　effect　of　a　respect　for　something　quite
different　from　life；　something　in　parison　and　contrast　with　which
life　with　all　its　enjoyment　has　no　value。　He　still　lives　only
because　it　is　his　duty；　not　because　he　finds　anything　pleasant　in
life。
　　Such　is　the　nature　of　the　true　motive　of　pure　practical　reason；　it
is　no　other　than　the　pure　moral　law　itself；　inasmuch　as　it　makes　us
conscious　of　the　sublimity　of　our　own　supersensible　existence　and
subjectively　produces　respect　for　their　higher　nature　in　men　who　are
also　conscious　of　their　sensible　existence　and　of　the　consequent
dependence　of　their　pathologically　very　susceptible　nature。　Now　with
this　motive　may　be　bined　so　many　charms　and　satisfactions　of　life
that　even　on　this　account　alone　the　most　prudent　choice　of　a
rational　Epicurean　reflecting　on　the　greatest　advantage　of　life
would　declare　itself　on　the　side　of　moral　conduct；　and　it　may　even
be　advisable　to　join　this　prospect　of　a　cheerful　enjoyment　of　life
with　that　supreme　motive　which　is　already　sufficient　of　itself；　but
only　as　a　counterpoise　to　the　attractions　which　vice　does　not　fail
to　exhibit　on　the　opposite　side；　and　not　so　as；　even　in　the　smallest
degree；　to　place　in　this　the　proper　moving　power　when　duty　is　in
question。　For　that　would　be　just　the　same　as　to　wish　to　taint　the
purity　of　the　moral　disposition　in　its　source。　The　majesty　of　duty　has
nothing　to　do　with　enjoyment　of　life；　it　has　its　special　law　and　its
special　tribunal；　and　though　the　two　should　be　never　so　well　shaken
together　to　be　given　well　mixed；　like　medicine；　to　the　sick　soul；
yet　they　will　soon　separate　of　themselves；　and　if　they　do　not；　the
former　will　not　act；　and　although　physical　life　might　gain　somewhat　in
force；　the　moral　life　would　fade　away　irrecoverably。

　　Critical　Examination　of　the　Analytic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　By　the　critical　examination　of　a　science；　or　of　a　portion　of　it；
which　constitutes　a　system　by　itself；　I　understand　the　inquiry　and
proof　why　it　must　have　this　and　no　other　systematic　form；　when　we
pare　it　with　another　system　which　is　based　on　a　similar　faculty
of　knowledge。　Now　practical　and　speculative　reason　are　based　on　the
same　faculty；　so　far　as　both　are　pure　reason。　Therefore　the　difference
in　their　systematic　form　must　be　determined　by　the　parison　of　both；
and　the　ground　of　this　must　be　assigned。
　　The　Analytic　of　pure　theoretic　reason　had　to　do　with　the　knowledge
of　such　objects　as　may　have　been　given　to　the　understanding；　and　was
obliged　therefore　to　begin　from　intuition　and　consequently　（as　this　is
always　sensible）　from　sensibility；　and　only　after　that　could　advance
to　concepts　（of　the　objects　of　this　intuition）；　and　could　only　end
with　principles　after　both　these　had　preceded。　On　the　contrary；
since　practical　reason　has　not　to　do　with　objects　so　as　to　know
them；　but　with　its　own　faculty　of　realizing　them　（in　accordance　with
the　knowledge　of　them）；　that　is；　with　a　will　which　is　a　causality；
inasmuch　as　reason　contains　its　determining　principle；　since；
consequently；　it　has　not　to　furnish　an　object　of　intuition；　but　as
practical　reason　has　to　furnish　only　a　law　（because　the　notion　of
causality　always　implies　the　reference　to　a　law　which　determines　the
existence　of　the　many　in　relation　to　one　another）；　hence　a　critical
examination　of　the　Analytic　of　reason；　if　this　is　to　be　practical
reason　（and　this　is　properly　the　problem）；　must　begin　with　the
possibility　of　practical　principles　a　priori。　Only　after　that　can　it
proceed　to　concepts　of　the　objects　of　a　practical　reason；　namely；
those　of　absolute　good　and　evil；　in　order　to　assign　them　in　accordance
with　those　principles　（for　prior　to　those　principles　they　cannot
possibly　be　given　as　good　and　evil　by　any　faculty　of　knowledge）；　and
only　then　could　the　section　be　concluded　with　the　last　chapter；
that；　namely；　which　treats　of　the　relation　of　the　pure　practical
reason　to　the　sensibility　and　of　its　necessary　influence　thereon；
which　is　a　priori　cognisable；　that　is；　of　the　moral　sentiment。　Thus
the　Analytic　of　the　practical　pure　reason　has　the　whole　extent　of
the　conditions　of　its　use　in　mon　with　the　theoretical；　but　in
reverse　order。　The　Analytic　of　pure　theoretic　reason　was　divided
into　transcendental　Aesthetic　and　transcendental　Logic；　that　of　the
practical　reversely　into　Logic　and　Aesthetic　of　pure　practical
reason　（if　I　may；　for　the　sake　of　analogy　merely；　use　these
designations；　which　are　not　quite　suitable）。　This　logic　again　was
there　divided　into　the　Analytic　of　concepts　and　that　of　principles：
here　into　that　of　principles　and　concepts。　The　Aesthetic　also　had　in
the　former　case　two　parts；　on　account　of　the　two　kinds　of　sensible
intuition；　here　the　sensibility　is　not　considered　as　a　capacity　of
intuition　at　all；　but　merely　as　feeling　（which　can　be　a　subjective
ground　of　desire）；　and　in　regard　to　it　pure　practical　reason　admits　no
further　division。
　　It　is　also　easy　to　see　the　reason　why　this　division　into　two　parts
with　its　subdivision　was　not　actually　adopted　here　（as　one　might
have　been　induced　to　attempt　by　the　example　of　the　former　critique）。
For　since　it　is　pure　reason　that　is　here　considered　in　its　practical
use；　and　consequently　as　proceeding　from　a　priori　principles；　and
not　from　empirical　principles　of　determination；　hence　the　division
of　the　analytic　of　pure　practical　reason　must　resemble　that　of　a
syllogism；　namely；　proceeding　from　the　universal　in　the　major
premiss　（the　moral　pr