the+critique+of+practical+reason-第23部分

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syllogism；　namely；　proceeding　from　the　universal　in　the　major
premiss　（the　moral　principle）；　through　a　minor　premiss　containing　a
subsumption　of　possible　actions　（as　good　or　evil）　under　the　former；　to
the　conclusion；　namely；　the　subjective　determination　of　the　will　（an
interest　in　the　possible　practical　good；　and　in　the　maxim　founded　on
it）。　He　who　has　been　able　to　convince　himself　of　the　truth　of　the
positions　occurring　in　the　Analytic　will　take　pleasure　in　such
parisons；　for　they　justly　suggest　the　expectation　that　we　may
perhaps　some　day　be　able　to　discern　the　unity　of　the　whole　faculty
of　reason　（theoretical　as　well　as　practical）　and　be　able　to　derive　all
from　one　principle；　which；　is　what　human　reason　inevitably　demands；　as
it　finds　plete　satisfaction　only　in　a　perfectly　systematic　unity　of
its　knowledge。
　　If　now　we　consider　also　the　contents　of　the　knowledge　that　we　can
have　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　and　by　means　of　it；　as　shown　by　the
Analytic；　we　find；　along　with　a　remarkable　analogy　between　it　and
the　theoretical；　no　less　remarkable　differences。　As　regards　the
theoretical；　the　faculty　of　a　pure　rational　cognition　a　priori　could
be　easily　and　evidently　proved　by　examples　from　sciences　（in　which；　as
they　put　their　principles　to　the　test　in　so　many　ways　by　methodical
use；　there　is　not　so　much　reason　as　in　mon　knowledge　to　fear　a
secret　mixture　of　empirical　principles　of　cognition）。　But；　that　pure
reason　without　the　admixture　of　any　empirical　principle　is　practical
of　itself；　this　could　only　be　shown　from　the　monest　practical　use
of　reason；　by　verifying　the　fact；　that　every　man's　natural　reason
acknowledges　the　supreme　practical　principle　as　the　supreme　law　of　his
will…　a　law　pletely　a　priori　and　not　depending　on　any　sensible
data。　It　was　necessary　first　to　establish　and　verify　the　purity　of　its
origin；　even　in　the　judgement　of　this　mon　reason；　before　science
could　take　it　in　hand　to　make　use　of　it；　as　a　fact；　that　is；　prior
to　all　disputation　about　its　possibility；　and　all　the　consequences
that　may　be　drawn　from　it。　But　this　circumstance　may　be　readily
explained　from　what　has　just　been　said；　because　practical　pure
reason　must　necessarily　begin　with　principles；　which　therefore　must　be
the　first　data；　the　foundation　of　all　science；　and　cannot　be　derived
from　it。　It　was　possible　to　effect　this　verification　of　moral
principles　as　principles　of　a　pure　reason　quite　well；　and　with
sufficient　certainty；　by　a　single　appeal　to　the　judgement　of　mon
sense；　for　this　reason；　that　anything　empirical　which　might　slip
into　our　maxims　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　can　be　detected
at　once　by　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain　which　necessarily
attaches　to　it　as　exciting　desire；　whereas　pure　practical　reason
positively　refuses　to　admit　this　feeling　into　its　principle　as　a
condition。　The　heterogeneity　of　the　determining　principles　（the
empirical　and　rational）　is　clearly　detected　by　this　resistance　of　a
practically　legislating　reason　against　every　admixture　of　inclination；
and　by　a　peculiar　kind　of　sentiment；　which；　however；　does　not
precede　the　legislation　of　the　practical　reason；　but；　on　the　contrary；
is　produced　by　this　as　a　constraint；　namely；　by　the　feeling　of　a
respect　such　as　no　man　has　for　inclinations　of　whatever　kind　but　for
the　law　only；　and　it　is　detected　in　so　marked　and　prominent　a　manner
that　even　the　most　uninstructed　cannot　fail　to　see　at　once　in　an
example　presented　to　him；　that　empirical　principles　of　volition　may
indeed　urge　him　to　follow　their　attractions；　but　that　he　can　never
be　expected　to　obey　anything　but　the　pure　practical　law　of　reason
alone。
　　The　distinction　between　the　doctrine　of　happiness　and　the　doctrine
of　morality；　in　the　former　of　which　empirical　principles　constitute
the　entire　foundation；　while　in　the　second　they　do　not　form　the
smallest　part　of　it；　is　the　first　and　most　important　office　of　the
Analytic　of　pure　practical　reason；　and　it　must　proceed　in　it　with　as
much　exactness　and；　so　to　speak；　scrupulousness；　as　any　geometer　in
his　work。　The　philosopher；　however；　has　greater　difficulties　to
contend　with　here　（as　always　in　rational　cognition　by　means　of
concepts　merely　without　construction）；　because　he　cannot　take　any
intuition　as　a　foundation　（for　a　pure　noumenon）。　He　has；　however；　this
advantage　that；　like　the　chemist；　he　can　at　any　time　make　an
experiment　with　every　man's　practical　reason　for　the　purpose　of
distinguishing　the　moral　（pure）　principle　of　determination　from　the
empirical；　namely；　by　adding　the　moral　law　（as　a　determining
principle）　to　the　empirically　affected　will　（e。g。；　that　of　the　man　who
would　be　ready　to　lie　because　he　can　gain　something　thereby）。　It　is　as
if　the　analyst　added　alkali　to　a　solution　of　lime　in　hydrochloric
acid；　the　acid　at　once　forsakes　the　lime；　bines　with　the　alkali；
and　the　lime　is　precipitated。　just　in　the　same　way；　if　to　a　man　who　is
otherwise　honest　（or　who　for　this　occasion　places　himself　only　in
thought　in　the　position　of　an　honest　man）；　we　present　the　moral　law　by
which　he　recognises　the　worthlessness　of　the　liar；　his　practical
reason　（in　forming　a　judgement　of　what　ought　to　be　done）　at　once
forsakes　the　advantage；　bines　with　that　which　maintains　in　him
respect　for　his　own　person　（truthfulness）；　and　the　advantage　after
it　has　been　separated　and　washed　from　every　particle　of　reason
（which　is　altogether　on　the　side　of　duty）　is　easily　weighed　by
everyone；　so　that　it　can　enter　into　bination　with　reason　in　other
cases；　only　not　where　it　could　be　opposed　to　the　moral　law；　which
reason　never　forsakes；　but　most　closely　unites　itself　with。
　　But　it　does　not　follow　that　this　distinction　between　the　principle
of　happiness　and　that　of　morality　is　an　opposition　between　them；　and
pure　practical　reason　does　not　require　that　we　should　renounce　all
claim　to　happiness；　but　only　that　the　moment　duty　is　in　question　we
should　take　no　account　of　happiness。　It　may　even　in　certain　respects
be　a　duty　to　provide　for　happiness；　partly；　because　（including
skill；　wealth；　riches）　it　contains　means　for　the　fulfilment　of　our
duty；　partly；　because　the　absence　of　it　（e。g。；　poverty）　implies
temptations　to　transgress　our　duty。　But　it　can　never　be　an　immediate
duty　to　promote　our　happiness；　still　less　can　it　be　the　principle　of
all　duty。　Now；　as　all　determining　principles　of　the　will；　except　the
law　of　pure　practical　reason　alone　（the　moral　law）；　are　all
empirical　and；　therefore；　as　such；　belong　to　the　principle　of
happiness；　they　must　all　be　kept　apart　from　the　supreme　principle　of
morality　and　never　be　incorporated　with　it　as　a　condition；　since
this　would　be　to　destroy　all　moral　worth　just　as　much　as　any　empirical
admixture　with　geometrical　principles　would　destroy　the　certainty　of
mathematical　evidence；　which　in　Plato's　opinion　is　the　most
excellent　thing　in　mathematics；　even　surpassing　their　utility。
　　Instead；　however；　of　the　deduction　of　the　supreme　principle　of
pure　practical　reason；　that　is；　the　explanation　of　the　possibility
of　such　a　knowledge　a　priori；　the　utmost　we　were　able　to　do　was　to
show　that　if　we　saw　the　possibility　of　the　freedom　of　an　efficient
cause；　we　should　also　see　not　merely　the　possibility；　but　even　the
necessity；　of　the　moral　law　as　the　supreme　practical　law　of　rational
beings；　to　whom　we　attribute　freedom　of　causality　of　their　will；
because　both　concepts　are　so　inseparably　united　that　we　might　define
practical　freedom　as　independence　of　the　will　on　anything　but　the
moral　law。　But　we　cannot　perceive　the　possibility　of　the　freedom　of　an
efficient　cause；　especially　in　the　world　of　sense；　we　are　fortunate　if
only　we　can　be　sufficiently　assured　that　there　is　no　proof　of　its
impossibility；　and　are　now；　by　the　moral　law　which　postulates　it；
pelled　and　therefore　authorized　to　assume　it。　However；　there　are
still　many　who　think　that　they　can　explain　this　freedom　on　empirical
principles；　like　any　other　physical　faculty；　and　treat　it　as　a
psychological　property；　the　explanation　of　which　only　requires　a
more　exact　study　of　the　nature　of　the　soul　and　of　the　motives　of　the
will；　and　not　as　a　transcendental　predicate　of　the　causality　of　a
being　that　belongs　to　the　world　of　sense　（which　is　really　the
point）。　They　thus　deprive　us　of　the　grand　revelation　which　we　obtain
through　practical　reason　by　means　of　the　moral　law；　the　revelation；
namely；　of　a　supersensible　world　by　the　realization　of　the　otherwise
transcendent　concept　of　freedom；　and　by　this　deprive　us　also　of　the
moral　law　itself；　which　admits　no　empirical　principle　of
determination。　Therefore　it　will　be　necessary　to　add　something　here　as
a　protection　against　this　delusion　and　to　exhibit　empiricism　in　its
naked　superficiality。
　　The　notion　of　causality　as　physical　necessity；　in　opposition　to
the　same　notion　as　freedom；　concerns　only　the　existence　of　things　so
far　as　it　is　determinable　in　time；　and；　consequently；　as　phenomena；　in
opposition　to　their　causality　as　things　in　themselves。　Now　if　we
take　the　attributes　of　existence　of　things　in　time　for　attributes　of
things　in　themselves　（which　is　the　mon　view）；　then　it　is　impossible
to　reconcile　the　necessity　of　the　causal　relation　with　freedom；　they