the+critique+of+practical+reason-第25部分

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accounts　for　his　error　from　some　bad　habits；　which　by　gradual
neglect　of　attention　he　has　allowed　to　grow　upon　him　to　such　a
degree　that　he　can　regard　his　error　as　its　natural　consequence；
although　this　cannot　protect　him　from　the　blame　and　reproach　which
he　casts　upon　himself。　This　is　also　the　ground　of　repentance　for　a
long　past　action　at　every　recollection　of　it；　a　painful　feeling
produced　by　the　moral　sentiment；　and　which　is　practically　void　in　so
far　as　it　cannot　serve　to　undo　what　has　been　done。　（Hence　Priestley；
as　a　true　and　consistent　fatalist；　declares　it　absurd；　and　he　deserves
to　be　mended　for　this　candour　more　than　those　who；　while　they
maintain　the　mechanism　of　the　will　in　fact；　and　its　freedom　in　words
only；　yet　wish　it　to　be　thought　that　they　include　it　in　their　system
of　promise；　although　they　do　not　explain　the　possibility　of　such
moral　imputation。）　But　the　pain　is　quite　legitimate；　because　when
the　law　of　our　intelligible　＇supersensible＇　existence　（the　moral
law）　is　in　question；　reason　recognizes　no　distinction　of　time；　and
only　asks　whether　the　event　belongs　to　me；　as　my　act；　and　then
always　morally　connects　the　same　feeling　with　it；　whether　it　has
happened　just　now　or　long　ago。　For　in　reference　to　the　supersensible
consciousness　of　its　existence　（i。e。；　freedom）　the　life　of　sense　is
but　a　single　phenomenon；　which；　inasmuch　as　it　contains　merely
manifestations　of　the　mental　disposition　with　regard　to　the　moral
law　（i。e。；　of　the　character）；　must　be　judged　not　according　to　the
physical　necessity　that　belongs　to　it　as　phenomenon；　but　according
to　the　absolute　spontaneity　of　freedom。　It　may　therefore　be　admitted
that；　if　it　were　possible　to　have　so　profound　an　insight　into　a
man's　mental　character　as　shown　by　internal　as　well　as　external
actions　as　to　know　all　its　motives；　even　the　smallest；　and　likewise
all　the　external　occasions　that　can　influence　them；　we　could　calculate
a　man's　conduct　for　the　future　with　as　great　certainty　as　a　lunar　or
solar　eclipse；　and　nevertheless　we　may　maintain　that　the　man　is
free。　In　fact；　if　we　were　capable　of　a　further　glance；　namely；　an
intellectual　intuition　of　the　same　subject　（which　indeed　is　not
granted　to　us；　and　instead　of　it　we　have　only　the　rational　concept）；
then　we　should　perceive　that　this　whole　chain　of　appearances　in　regard
to　all　that　concerns　the　moral　laws　depends　on　the　spontaneity　of
the　subject　as　a　thing　in　itself；　of　the　determination　of　which　no
physical　explanation　can　be　given。　In　default　of　this　intuition；　the
moral　law　assures　us　of　this　distinction　between　the　relation　of　our
actions　as　appearance　to　our　sensible　nature；　and　the　relation　of　this
sensible　nature　to　the　supersensible　substratum　in　us。　In　this　view；
which　is　natural　to　our　reason；　though　inexplicable；　we　can　also
justify　some　judgements　which　we　passed　with　all　conscientiousness；
and　which　yet　at　first　sight　seem　quite　opposed　to　all　equity。　There
are　cases　in　which　men；　even　with　the　same　education　which　has　been
profitable　to　others；　yet　show　such　early　depravity；　and　so　continue
to　progress　in　it　to　years　of　manhood；　that　they　are　thought　to　be
born　villains；　and　their　character　altogether　incapable　of
improvement；　and　nevertheless　they　are　judged　for　what　they　do　or
leave　undone；　they　are　reproached　for　their　faults　as　guilty；　nay；
they　themselves　（the　children）　regard　these　reproaches　as　well
founded；　exactly　as　if　in　spite　of　the　hopeless　natural　quality　of
mind　ascribed　to　them；　they　remained　just　as　responsible　as　any
other　man。　This　could　not　happen　if　we　did　not　suppose　that　whatever
springs　from　a　man's　choice　（as　every　action　intentionally　performed
undoubtedly　does）　has　as　its　foundation　a　free　causality；　which　from
early　youth　expresses　its　character　in　its　manifestations　（i。e。；
actions）。　These；　on　account　of　the　uniformity　of　conduct；　exhibit　a
natural　connection；　which　however　does　not　make　the　vicious　quality　of
the　will　necessary；　but　on　the　contrary；　is　the　consequence　of　the
evil　principles　voluntarily　adopted　and　unchangeable；　which　only
make　it　so　much　the　more　culpable　and　deserving　of　punishment。　There
still　remains　a　difficulty　in　the　bination　of　freedom　with　the
mechanism　of　nature　in　a　being　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　a
difficulty　which；　even　after　all　the　foregoing　is　admitted；
threatens　freedom　with　plete　destruction。　But　with　this　danger
there　is　also　a　circumstance　that　offers　hope　of　an　issue　still
favourable　to　freedom；　namely；　that　the　same　difficulty　presses　much
more　strongly　（in　fact　as　we　shall　presently　see；　presses　only）　on　the
system　that　holds　the　existence　determinable　in　time　and　space　to　be
the　existence　of　things　in　themselves；　it　does　not　therefore　oblige　us
to　give　up　our　capital　supposition　of　the　ideality　of　time　as　a　mere
form　of　sensible　intuition；　and　consequently　as　a　mere　manner　of
representation　which　is　proper　to　the　subject　as　belonging　to　the
world　of　sense；　and　therefore　it　only　requires　that　this　view　be
reconciled　with　this　idea。
　　The　difficulty　is　as　follows：　Even　if　it　is　admitted　that　the
supersensible　subject　can　be　free　with　respect　to　a　given　action；
although；　as　a　subject　also　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　he　is
under　mechanical　conditions　with　respect　to　the　same　action；　still；　as
soon　as　we　allow　that　God　as　universal　first　cause　is　also　the　cause
of　the　existence　of　substance　（a　proposition　which　can　never　be
given　up　without　at　the　same　time　giving　up　the　notion　of　God　as　the
Being　of　all　beings；　and　therewith　giving　up　his　all　sufficiency；　on
which　everything　in　theology　depends）；　it　seems　as　if　we　must　admit
that　a　man's　actions　have　their　determining　principle　in　something
which　is　wholly　out　of　his　power…　namely；　in　the　causality　of　a
Supreme　Being　distinct　from　himself　and　on　whom　his　own　existence
and　the　whole　determination　of　his　causality　are　absolutely　dependent。
In　point　of　fact；　if　a　man's　actions　as　belonging　to　his　modifications
in　time　were　not　merely　modifications　of　him　as　appearance；　but　as　a
thing　in　itself；　freedom　could　not　be　saved。　Man　would　be　a　marionette
or　an　automaton；　like　Vaucanson's；　prepared　and　wound　up　by　the
Supreme　Artist。　Self…consciousness　would　indeed　make　him　a　thinking
automaton；　but　the　consciousness　of　his　own　spontaneity　would　be
mere　delusion　if　this　were　mistaken　for　freedom；　and　it　would
deserve　this　name　only　in　a　parative　sense；　since；　although　the
proximate　determining　causes　of　its　motion　and　a　long　series　of
their　determining　causes　are　internal；　yet　the　last　and　highest　is
found　in　a　foreign　hand。　Therefore　I　do　not　see　how　those　who　still
insist　on　regarding　time　and　space　as　attributes　belonging　to　the
existence　of　things　in　themselves；　can　avoid　admitting　the　fatality　of
actions；　or　if　（like　the　otherwise　acute　Mendelssohn）　they　allow
them　to　be　conditions　necessarily　belonging　to　the　existence　of　finite
and　derived　beings；　but　not　to　that　of　the　infinite　Supreme　Being；　I
do　not　see　on　what　ground　they　can　justify　such　a　distinction；　or；
indeed；　how　they　can　avoid　the　contradiction　that　meets　them；　when
they　hold　that　existence　in　time　is　an　attribute　necessarily　belonging
to　finite　things　in　themselves；　whereas　God　is　the　cause　of　this
existence；　but　cannot　be　the　cause　of　time　（or　space）　itself　（since
this　must　be　presupposed　as　a　necessary　a　priori　condition　of　the
existence　of　things）；　and　consequently　as　regards　the　existence　of
these　things。　His　causality　must　be　subject　to　conditions　and　even
to　the　condition　of　time；　and　this　would　inevitably　bring　in
everything　contradictory　to　the　notions　of　His　infinity　and
independence。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　quite　easy　for　us　to　draw　the
distinction　between　the　attribute　of　the　divine　existence　of　being
independent　on　all　time…conditions；　and　that　of　a　being　of　the　world
of　sense；　the　distinction　being　that　between　the　existence　of　a
being　in　itself　and　that　of　a　thing　in　appearance。　Hence；　if　this
ideality　of　time　and　space　is　not　adopted；　nothing　remains　but
Spinozism；　in　which　space　and　time　are　essential　attributes　of　the
Supreme　Being　Himself；　and　the　things　dependent　on　Him　（ourselves；
therefore；　included）　are　not　substances；　but　merely　accidents　inhering
in　Him；　since；　if　these　things　as　His　effects　exist　in　time　only；　this
being　the　condition　of　their　existence　in　themselves；　then　the　actions
of　these　beings　must　be　simply　His　actions　which　He　performs　in　some
place　and　time。　Thus；　Spinozism；　in　spite　of　the　absurdity　of　its
fundamental　idea；　argues　more　consistently　than　the　creation　theory
can；　when　beings　assumed　to　be　substances；　and　beings　in　themselves
existing　in　time；　are　regarded　as　effects　of　a　Supreme　Cause；　and
yet　as　not　＇belonging＇　to　Him　and　His　action；　but　as　separate
substances。
　　The　above…mentioned　difficulty　is　resolved　briefly　and　clearly　as
follows：　If　existence　in　time　is　a　mere　sensible　mode　of
representation　belonging　to　thinking　beings　in　the　world　and
consequently　does　not　apply　to　them　as　things　in　themselves；　then
the　creation　of　these　beings　is　a　creation　of　things　in　themselves；
since　the　notion　of　creation　does　not　belong　to　the　sensible　form