the+critique+of+practical+reason-第27部分

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supersensible　order　and　connection；　which；　however；　for　this　very
reason　cannot　be　extended　further　than　is　necessary　for　pure　practical
purposes。
　　Let　me　be　permitted　on　this　occasion　to　make　one　more　remark；
namely；　that　every　step　that　we　make　with　pure　reason；　even　in　the
practical　sphere　where　no　attention　is　paid　to　subtle　speculation；
nevertheless　accords　with　all　the　material　points　of　the　Critique　of
the　Theoretical　Reason　as　closely　and　directly　as　if　each　step　had
been　thought　out　with　deliberate　purpose　to　establish　this
confirmation。　Such　a　thorough　agreement；　wholly　unsought　for　and　quite
obvious　（as　anyone　can　convince　himself；　if　he　will　only　carry　moral
inquiries　up　to　their　principles）；　between　the　most　important
proposition　of　practical　reason　and　the　often　seemingly　too　subtle　and
needless　remarks　of　the　Critique　of　the　Speculative　Reason；
occasions　surprise　and　astonishment；　and　confirms　the　maxim　already
recognized　and　praised　by　others；　namely；　that　in　every　scientific
inquiry　we　should　pursue　our　way　steadily　with　all　possible
exactness　and　frankness；　without　caring　for　any　objections　that　may　be
raised　from　outside　its　sphere；　but；　as　far　as　we　can；　to　carry　out
our　inquiry　truthfully　and　pletely　by　itself。　Frequent
observation　has　convinced　me　that；　when　such　researches　are　concluded；
that　which　in　one　part　of　them　appeared　to　me　very　questionable；
considered　in　relation　to　other　extraneous　doctrines；　when　I　left　this
doubtfulness　out　of　sight　for　a　time　and　only　attended　to　the　business
in　hand　until　it　was　pleted；　at　last　was　unexpectedly　found　to
agree　perfectly　with　what　had　been　discovered　separately　without　the
least　regard　to　those　doctrines；　and　without　any　partiality　or
prejudice　for　them。　Authors　would　save　themselves　many　errors　and　much
labour　lost　（because　spent　on　a　delusion）　if　they　could　only　resolve
to　go　to　work　with　more　frankness。
　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　a　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　Generally。

　　Pure　reason　always　has　its　dialetic；　whether　it　is　considered　in　its
speculative　or　its　practical　employment；　for　it　requires　the
absolute　totality　of　the　'conditions　of　what　is　given　conditioned；　and
this　can　only　be　found　in　things　in　themselves。　But　as　all　conceptions
of　things　in　themselves　must　be　referred　to　intuitions；　and　with　us
men　these　can　never　be　other　than　sensible　and　hence　can　never
enable　us　to　know　objects　as　things　in　themselves　but　only　as
appearances；　and　since　the　unconditioned　can　never　be　found　in　this
chain　of　appearances　which　consists　only　of　conditioned　and
conditions；　thus　from　applying　this　rational　idea　of　the　totality　of
the　conditions　（in　other　words　of　the　unconditioned）　to　appearances；
there　arises　an　inevitable　illusion；　as　if　these　latter　were　things　in
themselves　（for　in　the　absence　of　a　warning　critique　they　are　always
regarded　as　such）。　This　illusion　would　never　be　noticed　as　delusive　if
it　did　not　betray　itself　by　a　conflict　of　reason　with　itself；　when
it　applies　to　appearances　its　fundamental　principle　of　presupposing
the　unconditioned　to　everything　conditioned。　By　this；　however；
reason　is　pelled　to　trace　this　illusion　to　its　source；　and　search
how　it　can　be　removed；　and　this　can　only　be　done　by　a　plete
critical　examination　of　the　whole　pure　faculty　of　reason；　so　that
the　antinomy　of　the　pure　reason　which　is　manifest　in　its　dialectic
is　in　fact　the　most　beneficial　error　into　which　human　reason　could
ever　have　fallen；　since　it　at　last　drives　us　to　search　for　the　key
to　escape　from　this　labyrinth；　and　when　this　key　is　found；　it
further　discovers　that　which　we　did　not　seek　but　yet　had　need　of；
namely；　a　view　into　a　higher　and　an　immutable　order　of　things；　in
which　we　even　now　are；　and　in　which　we　are　thereby　enabled　by　definite
precepts　to　continue　to　live　according　to　the　highest　dictates　of
reason。
　　It　may　be　seen　in　detail　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　how　in　its
speculative　employment　this　natural　dialectic　is　to　be　solved；　and　how
the　error　which　arises　from　a　very　natural　illusion　may　be　guarded
against。　But　reason　in　its　practical　use　is　not　a　whit　better　off。
As　pure　practical　reason；　it　likewise　seeks　to　find　the
unconditioned　for　the　practically　conditioned　（which　rests　on
inclinations　and　natural　wants）；　and　this　is　not　as　the　determining
principle　of　the　will；　but　even　when　this　is　given　（in　the　moral
law）　it　seeks　the　unconditioned　totality　of　the　object　of　pure
practical　reason　under　the　name　of　the　summum　bonum。
　　To　define　this　idea　practically；　i。e。；　sufficiently　for　the　maxims
of　our　rational　conduct；　is　the　business　of　practical　wisdom；　and　this
again　as　a　science　is　philosophy；　in　the　sense　in　which　the　word　was
understood　by　the　ancients；　with　whom　it　meant　instruction　in　the
conception　in　which　the　summum　bonum　was　to　be　placed；　and　the　conduct
by　which　it　was　to　be　obtained。　It　would　be　well　to　leave　this　word　in
its　ancient　signification　as　a　doctrine　of　the　summum　bonum；　so　far　as
reason　endeavours　to　make　this　into　a　science。　For　on　the　one　band　the
restriction　annexed　would　suit　the　Greek　expression　（which　signifies
the　love　of　wisdom）；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　would　be　sufficient　to
embrace　under　the　name　of　philosophy　the　love　of　science：　that　is　to
say；　of　all　speculative　rational　knowledge；　so　far　as　it　is
serviceable　to　reason；　both　for　that　conception　and　also　for　the
practical　principle　determining　our　conduct；　without　letting　out　of
sight　the　main　end；　on　account　of　which　alone　it　can　be　called　a
doctrine　of　practical　wisdom。　On　the　other　hand；　it　would　be　no　harm
to　deter　the　self…conceit　of　one　who　ventures　to　claim　the　title　of
philosopher　by　holding　before　him　in　the　very　definition　a　standard　of
self…estimation　which　would　very　much　lower　his　pretensions。　For　a
teacher　of　wisdom　would　mean　something　more　than　a　scholar　who　has　not
e　so　far　as　to　guide　himself；　much　less　to　guide　others；　with
certain　expectation　of　attaining　so　high　an　end：　it　would　mean　a
master　in　the　knowledge　of　wisdom；　which　implies　more　than　a　modest
man　would　claim　for　himself。　Thus　philosophy　as　well　as　wisdom　would
always　remain　an　ideal；　which　objectively　is　presented　plete　in
reason　alone；　while　subjectively　for　the　person　it　is　only　the　goal　of
his　unceasing　endeavours；　and　no　one　would　be　justified　in
professing　to　be　in　possession　of　it　so　as　to　assume　the　name　of
philosopher　who　could　not　also　show　its　infallible　effects　in　his
own　person　as　an　example　（in　his　self…mastery　and　the　unquestioned
interest　that　he　takes　pre…eminently　in　the　general　good）；　and　this
the　ancients　also　required　as　a　condition　of　deserving　that　honourable
title。
　　We　have　another　preliminary　remark　to　make　respecting　the
dialectic　of　the　pure　practical　reason；　on　the　point　of　the　definition
of　the　summum　bonum　（a　successful　solution　of　which　dialectic　would
lead　us　to　expect；　as　in　case　of　that　of　the　theoretical　reason；　the
most　beneficial　effects；　inasmuch　as　the　self…contradictions　of　pure
practical　reason　honestly　stated；　and　not　concealed；　force　us　to
undertake　a　plete　critique　of　this　faculty）。
　　The　moral　law　is　the　sole　determining　principle　of　a　pure　will。
But　since　this　is　merely　formal　（viz。；　as　prescribing　only　the　form　of
the　maxim　as　universally　legislative）；　it　abstracts　as　a　determining
principle　from　all　matter　that　is　to　say；　from　every　object　of
volition。　Hence；　though　the　summum　bonum　may　be　the　whole　object　of
a　pure　practical　reason；　i。e。；　a　pure　will；　yet　it　is　not　on　that
account　to　be　regarded　as　its　determining　principle；　and　the　moral　law
alone　must　be　regarded　as　the　principle　on　which　that　and　its
realization　or　promotion　are　aimed　at。　This　remark　is　important　in
so　delicate　a　case　as　the　determination　of　moral　principles；　where　the
slightest　misinterpretation　perverts　men's　minds。　For　it　will　have
been　seen　from　the　Analytic　that；　if　we　assume　any　object　under　the
name　of　a　good　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　prior　to　the
moral　law　and　then　deduce　from　it　the　supreme　practical　principle；
this　would　always　introduce　heteronomy　and　crush　out　the　moral
principle。
　　It　is；　however；　evident　that　if　the　notion　of　the　summum　bonum
includes　that　of　the　moral　law　as　its　supreme　condition；　then　the
summum　bonum　would　not　merely　be　an　object；　but　the　notion　of　it　and
the　conception　of　its　existence　as　possible　by　our　own　practical
reason　would　likewise　be　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；
since　in　that　case　the　will　is　in　fact　determined　by　the　moral　law
which　is　already　included　in　this　conception；　and　by　no　other
object；　as　the　principle　of　autonomy　requires。　This　order　of　the
conceptions　of　determination　of　the　will　must　not　be　lost　sight　of；　as
otherwise　we　should　misunderstand　ourselves　and　think　we　had　fallen
into　a　contradiction；　while　everything　remains　in　perfect　harmony。
　　　　CHAPTER　II。　Of　the　Dialectic　of　Pure　Reason　in　defining　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conception　of　the　〃Summum　Bonum〃。

　　The　conception　of　the　summum　itself　contains　an　ambiguity　which
might　occasion　needless　disputes　if　we　did　not　attend　to　it。　The
summum　may　mean　ei