the+critique+of+practical+reason-第33部分

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（holy　and　good）　and　at　the　same　time　all…powerful　will；　and
consequently　only　through　harmony　with　this　will；　that　we　can　hope
to　attain　the　summum　bonum　which　the　moral　law　makes　it　our　duty　to
take　as　the　object　of　our　endeavours。　Here　again；　then；　all　remains
disinterested　and　founded　merely　on　duty；　neither　fear　nor　hope
being　made　the　fundamental　springs；　which　if　taken　as　principles　would
destroy　the　whole　moral　worth　of　actions。　The　moral　law　mands　me　to
make　the　highest　possible　good　in　a　world　the　ultimate　object　of　all
my　conduct。　But　I　cannot　hope　to　effect　this　otherwise　than　by　the
harmony　of　my　will　with　that　of　a　holy　and　good　Author　of　the　world；
and　although　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　as　a　whole；　in　which
the　greatest　happiness　is　conceived　as　bined　in　the　most　exact
proportion　with　the　highest　degree　of　moral　perfection　（possible　in
creatures）；　includes　my　own　happiness；　yet　it　is　not　this　that　is
the　determining　principle　of　the　will　which　is　enjoined　to　promote　the
summum　bonum；　but　the　moral　law；　which；　on　the　contrary；　limits　by
strict　conditions　my　unbounded　desire　of　happiness。
　　Hence　also　morality　is　not　properly　the　doctrine　how　we　should
make　ourselves　happy；　but　how　we　should　bee　worthy　of　happiness。　It
is　only　when　religion　is　added　that　there　also　es　in　the　hope　of
participating　some　day　in　happiness　in　proportion　as　we　have
endeavoured　to　be　not　unworthy　of　it。
　　A　man　is　worthy　to　possess　a　thing　or　a　state　when　his　possession　of
it　is　in　harmony　with　the　summum　bonum。　We　can　now　easily　see　that　all
worthiness　depends　on　moral　conduct；　since　in　the　conception　of　the
summum　bonum　this　constitutes　the　condition　of　the　rest　（which　belongs
to　one's　state）；　namely；　the　participation　of　happiness。　Now　it
follows　from　this　that　morality　should　never　be　treated　as　a
doctrine　of　happiness；　that　is；　an　instruction　how　to　bee　happy；
for　it　has　to　do　simply　with　the　rational　condition　（conditio　sine　qua
non）　of　happiness；　not　with　the　means　of　attaining　it。　But　when
morality　has　been　pletely　expounded　（which　merely　imposes　duties
instead　of　providing　rules　for　selfish　desires）；　then　first；　after　the
moral　desire　to　promote　the　summum　bonum　（to　bring　the　kingdom　of
God　to　us）　has　been　awakened；　a　desire　founded　on　a　law；　and　which
could　not　previously　arise　in　any　selfish　mind；　and　when　for　the
behoof　of　this　desire　the　step　to　religion　has　been　taken；　then　this
ethical　doctrine　may　be　also　called　a　doctrine　of　happiness　because
the　hope　of　happiness　first　begins　with　religion　only。
　　We　can　also　see　from　this　that；　when　we　ask　what　is　God's　ultimate
end　in　creating　the　world；　we　must　not　name　the　happiness　of　the
rational　beings　in　it；　but　the　summum　bonum；　which　adds　a　further
condition　to　that　wish　of　such　beings；　namely；　the　condition　of
being　worthy　of　happiness；　that　is；　the　morality　of　these　same
rational　beings；　a　condition　which　alone　contains　the　rule　by　which
only　they　can　hope　to　share　in　the　former　at　the　hand　of　a　wise
Author。　For　as　wisdom；　theoretically　considered；　signifies　the
knowledge　of　the　summum　bonum　and；　practically；　the　accordance　of
the　will　with　the　summum　bonum；　we　cannot　attribute　to　a　supreme
independent　wisdom　an　end　based　merely　on　goodness。　For　we　cannot
conceive　the　action　of　this　goodness　（in　respect　of　the　happiness　of
rational　beings）　as　suitable　to　the　highest　original　good；　except
under　the　restrictive　conditions　of　harmony　with　the　holiness*　of
his　will。　Therefore；　those　who　placed　the　end　of　creation　in　the　glory
of　God　（provided　that　this　is　not　conceived　anthropomorphically　as　a
desire　to　be　praised）　have　perhaps　hit　upon　the　best　expression。　For
nothing　glorifies　God　more　than　that　which　is　the　most　estimable　thing
in　the　world；　respect　for　his　mand；　the　observance　of　the　holy　duty
that　his　law　imposes　on　us；　when　there　is　added　thereto　his　glorious
plan　of　crowning　such　a　beautiful　order　of　things　with　corresponding
happiness。　If　the　latter　（to　speak　humanly）　makes　Him　worthy　of
love；　by　the　former　He　is　an　object　of　adoration。　Even　men　can　never
acquire　respect　by　benevolence　alone；　though　they　may　gain　love；　so
that　the　greatest　beneficence　only　procures　them　honour　when　it　is
regulated　by　worthiness。

　　*In　order　to　make　these　characteristics　of　these　conceptions
clear；　I　add　the　remark　that　whilst　we　ascribe　to　God　various
attributes；　the　quality　of　which　we　also　find　applicable　to　creatures；
only　that　in　Him　they　are　raised　to　the　highest　degree；　e。g。；　power；
knowledge；　presence；　goodness；　etc。；　under　the　designations　of
omnipotence；　omniscience；　omnipresence；　etc。；　there　are　three　that　are
ascribed　to　God　exclusively；　and　yet　without　the　addition　of
greatness；　and　which　are　all　moral　He　is　the　only　holy；　the　only
blessed；　the　only　wise；　because　these　conceptions　already　imply　the
absence　of　limitation。　In　the　order　of　these　attributes　He　is　also　the
holy　lawgiver　（and　creator）；　the　good　governor　（and　preserver）　and　the
just　judge；　three　attributes　which　include　everything　by　which　God
is　the　object　of　religion；　and　in　conformity　with　which　the
metaphysical　perfections　are　added　of　themselves　in　the　reason。

　　That　in　the　order　of　ends；　man　（and　with　him　every　rational　being）
is　an　end　in　himself；　that　is；　that　he　can　never　be　used　merely　as　a
means　by　any　（not　even　by　God）　without　being　at　the　same　time　an　end
also　himself；　that　therefore　humanity　in　our　person　must　be　holy　to
ourselves；　this　follows　now　of　itself　because　he　is　the　subject　of　the
moral　law；　in　other　words；　of　that　which　is　holy　in　itself；　and　on
account　of　which　and　in　agreement　with　which　alone　can　anything　be
termed　holy。　For　this　moral　law　is　founded　on　the　autonomy　of　his
will；　as　a　free　will　which　by　its　universal　laws　must　necessarily　be
able　to　agree　with　that　to　which　it　is　to　submit　itself。

　　　　VI。　Of　the　Postulates　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　Generally。

　　They　all　proceed　from　the　principle　of　morality；　which　is　not　a
postulate　but　a　law；　by　which　reason　determines　the　will　directly；
which　will；　because　it　is　so　determined　as　a　pure　will；　requires　these
necessary　conditions　of　obedience　to　its　precept。　These　postulates　are
not　theoretical　dogmas　but；　suppositions　practically　necessary；
while　then　they　do　＇not＇　extend　our　speculative　knowledge；　they　give
objective　reality　to　the　ideas　of　speculative　reason　in　general　（by
means　of　their　reference　to　what　is　practical）；　and　give　it　a　right　to
concepts；　the　possibility　even　of　which　it　could　not　otherwise　venture
to　affirm。
　　These　postulates　are　those　of　immortality；　freedom　positively
considered　（as　the　causality　of　a　being　so　far　as　he　belongs　to　the
intelligible　world）；　and　the　existence　of　God。　The　first　results
from　the　practically　necessary　condition　of　a　duration　adequate　to　the
plete　fulfilment　of　the　moral　law；　the　second　from　the　necessary
supposition　of　independence　of　the　sensible　world；　and　of　the
faculty　of　determining　one's　will　according　to　the　law　of　an
intelligible　world；　that　is；　of　freedom；　the　third　from　the
necessary　condition　of　the　existence　of　the　summum　bonum　in　such　an
intelligible　world；　by　the　supposition　of　the　supreme　independent
good；　that　is；　the　existence　of　God。
　　Thus　the　fact　that　respect　for　the　moral　law　necessarily　makes　the
summum　bonum　an　object　of　our　endeavours；　and　the　supposition　thence
resulting　of　its　objective　reality；　lead　through　the　postulates　of
practical　reason　to　conceptions　which　speculative　reason　might
indeed　present　as　problems；　but　could　never　solve。　Thus　it　leads：　1。
To　that　one　in　the　solution　of　which　the　latter　could　do　nothing　but
mit　paralogisms　（namely；　that　of　immortality）；　because　it　could　not
lay　hold　of　the　character　of　permanence；　by　which　to　plete　the
psychological　conception　of　an　ultimate　subject　necessarily　ascribed
to　the　soul　in　self…consciousness；　so　as　to　make　it　the　real
conception　of　a　substance；　a　character　which　practical　reason
furnishes　by　the　postulate　of　a　duration　required　for　accordance
with　the　moral　law　in　the　summum　bonum；　which　is　the　whole　end　of
practical　reason。　2。　It　leads　to　that　of　which　speculative　reason
contained　nothing　but　antinomy；　the　solution　of　which　it　could　only
found　on　a　notion　Problematically　conceivable　indeed；　but　whose
objective　reality　it　could　not　prove　or　determine；　namely；　the
cosmological　idea　of　an　intelligible　world　and　the　consciousness　of
our　existence　in　it；　by　means　of　the　postulate　of　freedom　（the　reality
of　which　it　lays　down　by　virtue　of　the　moral　law）；　and　with　it
likewise　the　law　of　an　intelligible　world；　to　which　speculative　reason
could　only　point；　but　could　not　define　its　conception。　3。　What
speculative　reason　was　able　to　think；　but　was　obliged　to　leave
undetermined　as　a　mere　transcendental　ideal；　viz。；　the　theological
conception　of　the　first　Being；　to　this　it　gives　significance　（in　a
practical　view；　that　is；　as　a　condition　of　the　possibility　of　the
object　of　a　will　determined　by　that　law）；　namely；　as　the　supreme
principle　of　the　summum　bonum　in　an　intelligible　world；　by　means　of
moral　legislation　in　it　invested　with　sovereign　power。
　　Is　our　knowledge；　however；