the+critique+of+practical+reason-第34部分

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principle　of　the　summum　bonum　in　an　intelligible　world；　by　means　of
moral　legislation　in　it　invested　with　sovereign　power。
　　Is　our　knowledge；　however；　actually　extended　in　this　way　by　pure
practical　reason；　and　is　that　immanent　in　practical　reason　which　for
the　speculative　was　only　transcendent？　Certainly；　but　only　in　a
practical　point　of　view。　For　we　do　not　thereby　take　knowledge　of　the
nature　of　our　souls；　nor　of　the　intelligible　world；　nor　of　the　Supreme
Being；　with　respect　to　what　they　are　in　themselves；　but　we　have　merely
bined　the　conceptions　of　them　in　the　practical　concept　of　the
summum　bonum　as　the　object　of　our　will；　and　this　altogether　a
priori；　but　only　by　means　of　the　moral　law；　and　merely　in　reference　to
it；　in　respect　of　the　object　which　it　mands。　But　how　freedom　is
possible；　and　how　we　are　to　conceive　this　kind　of　causality
theoretically　and　positively；　is　not　thereby　discovered；　but　only　that
there　is　such　a　causality　is　postulated　by　the　moral　law　and　in　its
behoof。　It　is　the　same　with　the　remaining　ideas；　the　possibility　of
which　no　human　intelligence　will　ever　fathom；　but　the　truth　of
which；　on　the　other　hand；　no　sophistry　will　ever　wrest　from　the
conviction　even　of　the　monest　man。

　　VII。　How　is　it　possible　to　conceive　an　Extension　of　Pure
　　　　　　　Reason　in　a　Practical　point　of　view；　without　its
　　　　　　　　　　Knowledge　as　Speculative　being　enlarged　at
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　the　same　time？

　　In　order　not　to　be　too　abstract；　we　will　answer　this　question　at
once　in　its　application　to　the　present　case。　In　order　to　extend　a　pure
cognition　practically；　there　must　be　an　a　priori　purpose　given；　that
is；　an　end　as　object　（of　the　will）；　which　independently　of　all
theological　principle　is　presented　as　practically　necessary　by　an
imperative　which　determines　the　will　directly　（a　categorical
imperative）；　and　in　this　case　that　is　the　summum　bonum。　This；　however；
is　not　possible　without　presupposing　three　theoretical　conceptions
（for　which；　because　they　are　mere　conceptions　of　pure　reason；　no
corresponding　intuition　can　be　found；　nor　consequently　by　the　path
of　theory　any　objective　reality）；　namely；　freedom；　immortality；　and
God。　Thus　by　the　practical　law　which　mands　the　existence　of　the
highest　good　possible　in　a　world；　the　possibility　of　those　objects
of　pure　speculative　reason　is　postulated；　and　the　objective　reality
which　the　latter　could　not　assure　them。　By　this　the　theoretical
knowledge　of　pure　reason　does　indeed　obtain　an　accession；　but　it
consists　only　in　this；　that　those　concepts　which　otherwise　it　had　to
look　upon　as　problematical　（merely　thinkable）　concepts；　are　now
shown　assertorially　to　be　such　as　actually　have　objects；　because
practical　reason　indispensably　requires　their　existence　for　the
possibility　of　its　object；　the　summum　bonum；　which　practically　is
absolutely　necessary；　and　this　justifies　theoretical　reason　in
assuming　them。　But　this　extension　of　theoretical　reason　is　no
extension　of　speculative；　that　is；　we　cannot　make　any　positive　use
of　it　in　a　theoretical　point　of　view。　For　as　nothing　is　acplished
in　this　by　practical　reason；　further　than　that　these　concepts　are　real
and　actually　have　their　（possible）　objects；　and　nothing　in　the　way
of　intuition　of　them　is　given　thereby　（which　indeed　could　not　be
demanded）；　hence　the　admission　of　this　reality　does　not　render　any
synthetical　proposition　possible。　Consequently；　this　discovery　does
not　in　the　least　help　us　to　extend　this　knowledge　of　ours　in　a
speculative　point　of　view；　although　it　does　in　respect　of　the
practical　employment　of　pure　reason。　The　above　three　ideas　of
speculative　reason　are　still　in　themselves　not　cognitions；　they　are
however　（transcendent）　thoughts；　in　which　there　is　nothing　impossible。
Now；　by　help　of　an　apodeictic　practical　law；　being　necessary
conditions　of　that　which　it　mands　to　be　made　an　object；　they
acquire　objective　reality；　that　is；　we　learn　from　it　that　they　have
objects；　without　being　able　to　point　out　how　the　conception　of　them　is
related　to　an　object；　and　this；　too；　is　still　not　a　cognition　of　these
objects；　for　we　cannot　thereby　form　any　synthetical　judgement　about
them；　nor　determine　their　application　theoretically；　consequently；
we　can　make　no　theoretical　rational　use　of　them　at　all；　in　which　use
all　speculative　knowledge　of　reason　consists。　Nevertheless；　the
theoretical　knowledge；　not　indeed　of　these　objects；　but　of　reason
generally；　is　so　far　enlarged　by　this；　that　by　the　practical
postulates　objects　were　given　to　those　ideas；　a　merely　problematical
thought　having　by　this　means　first　acquired　objective　reality。　There
is　therefore　no　extension　of　the　knowledge　of　given　supersensible
objects；　but　an　extension　of　theoretical　reason　and　of　its　knowledge
in　respect　of　the　supersensible　generally；　inasmuch　as　it　is　pelled
to　admit　that　there　are　such　objects；　although　it　is　not　able　to
define　them　more　closely；　so　as　itself　to　extend　this　knowledge　of　the
objects　（which　have　now　been　given　it　on　practical　grounds；　and　only
for　practical　use）。　For　this　accession；　then；　pure　theoretical　reason；
for　which　all　those　ideas　are　transcendent　and　without　object；　has
simply　to　thank　its　practical　faculty。　In　this　they　bee　immanent
and　constitutive；　being　the　source　of　the　possibility　of　realizing　the
necessary　object　of　pure　practical　reason　（the　summum　bonum）；
whereas　apart　from　this　they　are　transcendent；　and　merely　regulative
principles　of　speculative　reason；　which　do　not　require　it　to　assume
a　new　object　beyond　experience；　but　only　to　bring　its　use　in
experience　nearer　to　pleteness。　But　when　once　reason　is　in
possession　of　this　accession；　it　will　go　to　work　with　these　ideas　as
speculative　reason　（properly　only　to　assure　the　certainty　of　its
practical　use）　in　a　negative　manner：　that　is；　not　extending　but
clearing　up　its　knowledge　so　as　on　one　side　to　keep　off
anthropomorphism；　as　the　source　of　superstition；　or　seeming
extension　of　these　conceptions　by　supposed　experience；　and　on　the
other　side　fanaticism；　which　promises　the　same　by　means　of
supersensible　intuition　or　feelings　of　the　like　kind。　All　these　are
hindrances　to　the　practical　use　of　pure　reason；　so　that　the　removal　of
them　may　certainly　be　considered　an　extension　of　our　knowledge　in　a
practical　point　of　view；　without　contradicting　the　admission　that
for　speculative　purposes　reason　has　not　in　the　least　gained　by　this。
　　Every　employment　of　reason　in　respect　of　an　object　requires　pure
concepts　of　the　understanding　（categories）；　without　which　no　object
can　be　conceived。　These　can　be　applied　to　the　theoretical　employment
of　reason；　i。e。；　to　that　kind　of　knowledge；　only　in　case　an
intuition　（which　is　always　sensible）　is　taken　as　a　basis；　and
therefore　merely　in　order　to　conceive　by　means　of…　them　an　object　of
possible　experience。　Now　here　what　have　to　be　thought　by　means　of
the　categories　in　order　to　be　known　are　ideas　of　reason；　which
cannot　be　given　in　any　experience。　Only　we　are　not　here　concerned　with
the　theoretical　knowledge　of　the　objects　of　these　ideas；　but　only　with
this；　whether　they　have　objects　at　all。　This　reality　is　supplied　by
pure　practical　reason；　and　theoretical　reason　has　nothing　further　to
do　in　this　but　to　think　those　objects　by　means　of　categories。　This；　as
we　have　elsewhere　clearly　shown；　can　be　done　well　enough　without
needing　any　intuition　（either　sensible　or　supersensible）　because　the
categories　have　their　seat　and　origin　in　the　pure　understanding；
simply　as　the　faculty　of　thought；　before　and　independently　of　any
intuition；　and　they　always　only　signify　an　object　in　general；　no
matter　in　what　way　it　may　be　given　to　us。　Now　when　the　categories
are　to　be　applied　to　these　ideas；　it　is　not　possible　to　give　them
any　object　in　intuition；　but　that　such　an　object　actually　exists；
and　consequently　that　the　category　as　a　mere　form　of　thought　is　here
not　empty　but　has　significance；　this　is　sufficiently　assured　them　by
an　object　which　practical　reason　presents　beyond　doubt　in　the
concept　of　the　summum　bonum；　the　reality　of　the　conceptions　which
are　required　for　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　without；
however；　effecting　by　this　accession　the　least　extension　of　our
knowledge　on　theoretical　principles。

　　When　these　ideas　of　God；　of　an　intelligible　world　（the　kingdom　of
God）；　and　of　immortality　are　further　determined　by　predicates　taken
from　our　own　nature；　we　must　not　regard　this　determination　as　a
sensualizing　of　those　pure　rational　ideas　（anthropomorphism）；　nor　as　a
transcendent　knowledge　of　supersensible　objects；　for　these
predicates　are　no　others　than　understanding　and　will；　considered　too
in　the　relation　to　each　other　in　which　they　must　be　conceived　in　the
moral　law；　and　therefore；　only　so　far　as　a　pure　practical　use　is
made　of　them。　As　to　all　the　rest　that　belongs　to　these　conceptions
psychologically；　that　is；　so　far　as　we　observe　these　faculties　of　ours
empirically　in　their　exercise　（e。g。；　that　the　understanding　of　man
is　discursive；　and　its　notions　therefore　not　intuitions　but
thoughts；　that　these　follow　one　another　in　time；　that　his　will　has　its
satisfaction　always　dependent　on　the　existence　of　its　object；　etc。；
which　cannot　b