the+critique+of+practical+reason-第5部分

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　　All　practical　principles　which　presuppose　an　object　（matter）　of
the　faculty　of　desire　as　the　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　are
empirical　and　can　furnish　no　practical　laws。
　　By　the　matter　of　the　faculty　of　desire　I　mean　an　object　the
realization　of　which　is　desired。　Now；　if　the　desire　for　this　object
precedes　the　practical　rule　and　is　the　condition　of　our　making　it　a
principle；　then　I　say　（in　the　first　place）　this　principle　is　in　that
case　wholly　empirical；　for　then　what　determines　the　choice　is　the　idea
of　an　object　and　that　relation　of　this　idea　to　the　subject　by　which
its　faculty　of　desire　is　determined　to　its　realization。　Such　a
relation　to　the　subject　is　called　the　pleasure　in　the　realization　of
an　object。　This；　then；　must　be　presupposed　as　a　condition　of　the
possibility　of　determination　of　the　will。　But　it　is　impossible　to　know
a　priori　of　any　idea　of　an　object　whether　it　will　be　connected　with
pleasure　or　pain；　or　be　indifferent。　In　such　cases；　therefore；　the
determining　principle　of　the　choice　must　be　empirical　and；
therefore；　also　the　practical　material　principle　which　presupposes
it　as　a　condition。
　　In　the　second　place；　since　susceptibility　to　a　pleasure　or　pain
can　be　known　only　empirically　and　cannot　hold　in　the　same　degree　for
all　rational　beings；　a　principle　which　is　based　on　this　subjective
condition　may　serve　indeed　as　a　maxim　for　the　subject　which
possesses　this　susceptibility；　but　not　as　a　law　even　to　him　（because
it　is　wanting　in　objective　necessity；　which　must　be　recognized　a
priori）；　it　follows；　therefore；　that　such　a　principle　can　never
furnish　a　practical　law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　III。　THEOREM　II。

　　All　material　practical　principles　as　such　are　of　one　and　the　same
kind　and　e　under　the　general　principle　of　self…love　or　private
happiness。
　　Pleasure　arising　from　the　idea　of　the　idea　of　the　existence　of　a
thing；　in　so　far　as　it　is　to　determine　the　desire　of　this　thing；　is
founded　on　the　susceptibility　of　the　subject；　since　it　depends　on
the　presence　of　an　object；　hence　it　belongs　to　sense　（feeling）；　and
not　to　understanding；　which　expresses　a　relation　of　the　idea　to　an
object　according　to　concepts；　not　to　the　subject　according　to
feelings。　It　is；　then；　practical　only　in　so　far　as　the　faculty　of
desire　is　determined　by　the　sensation　of　agreeableness　which　the
subject　expects　from　the　actual　existence　of　the　object。　Now；　a
rational　being's　consciousness　of　the　pleasantness　of　life
uninterruptedly　acpanying　his　whole　existence　is　happiness；　and　the
principle　which　makes　this　the　supreme　ground　of　determination　of
the　will　is　the　principle　of　self…love。　All　material　principles；　then；
which　place　the　determining　ground　of　the　will　in　the　pleasure　or　pain
to　be　received　from　the　existence　of　any　object　are　all　of　the　same
kind；　inasmuch　as　they　all　belong　to　the　principle　of　self…love　or
private　happiness。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　COROLLARY。

　　All　material　practical　rules　place　the　determining　principle　of
the　will　in　the　lower　desires；　and　if　there　were　no　purely　formal　laws
of　the　will　adequate　to　determine　it；　then　we　could　not　admit　any
higher　desire　at　all。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　I。

　　It　is　surprising　that　men；　otherwise　acute；　can　think　it　possible　to
distinguish　between　higher　and　lower　desires；　according　as　the　ideas
which　are　connected　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure　have　their　origin
in　the　senses　or　in　the　understanding；　for　when　we　inquire　what　are
the　determining　grounds　of　desire；　and　place　them　in　some　expected
pleasantness；　it　is　of　no　consequence　whence　the　idea　of　this　pleasing
object　is　derived；　but　only　how　much　it　pleases。　Whether　an　idea　has
its　seat　and　source　in　the　understanding　or　not；　if　it　can　only
determine　the　choice　by　presupposing　a　feeling　of　pleasure　in　the
subject；　it　follows　that　its　capability　of　determining　the　choice
depends　altogether　on　the　nature　of　the　inner　sense；　namely；　that　this
can　be　agreeably　affected　by　it。　However　dissimilar　ideas　of　objects
may　be；　though　they　be　ideas　of　the　understanding；　or　even　of　the
reason　in　contrast　to　ideas　of　sense；　yet　the　feeling　of　pleasure；
by　means　of　which　they　constitute　the　determining　principle　of　the
will　（the　expected　satisfaction　which　impels　the　activity　to　the
production　of　the　object）；　is　of　one　and　the　same　kind；　not　only
inasmuch　as　it　can　only　be　known　empirically；　but　also　inasmuch　as
it　affects　one　and　the　same　vital　force　which　manifests　itself　in
the　faculty　of　desire；　and　in　this　respect　can　only　differ　in　degree
from　every　other　ground　of　determination。　Otherwise；　how　could　we
pare　in　respect　of　magnitude　two　principles　of　determination；　the
ideas　of　which　depend　upon　different　faculties；　so　as　to　prefer　that
which　affects　the　faculty　of　desire　in　the　highest　degree。　The　same
man　may　return　unread　an　instructive　book　which　he　cannot　again
obtain；　in　order　not　to　miss　a　hunt；　he　may　depart　in　the　midst　of　a
fine　speech；　in　order　not　to　be　late　for　dinner；　he　may　leave　a
rational　conversation；　such　as　he　otherwise　values　highly；　to　take　his
place　at　the　gaming…table；　he　may　even　repulse　a　poor　man　whom　he　at
other　times　takes　pleasure　in　benefiting；　because　he　has　only　just
enough　money　in　his　pocket　to　pay　for　his　admission　to　the　theatre。　If
the　determination　of　his　will　rests　on　the　feeling　of　the
agreeableness　or　disagreeableness　that　he　expects　from　any　cause；　it
is　all　the　same　to　him　by　what　sort　of　ideas　he　will　be　affected。
The　only　thing　that　concerns　him；　in　order　to　decide　his　choice；　is；
how　great；　how　long　continued；　how　easily　obtained；　and　how　often
repeated；　this　agreeableness　is。　just　as　to　the　man　who　wants　money　to
spend；　it　is　all　the　same　whether　the　gold　was　dug　out　of　the　mountain
or　washed　out　of　the　sand；　provided　it　is　everywhere　accepted　at　the
same　value；　so　the　man　who　cares　only　for　the　enjoyment　of　life　does
not　ask　whether　the　ideas　are　of　the　understanding　or　the　senses；
but　only　how　much　and　how　great　pleasure　they　will　give　for　the
longest　time。　It　is　only　those　that　would　gladly　deny　to　pure　reason
the　power　of　determining　the　will；　without　the　presupposition　of　any
feeling；　who　could　deviate　so　far　from　their　own　exposition　as　to
describe　as　quite　heterogeneous　what　they　have　themselves　previously
brought　under　one　and　the　same　principle。　Thus；　for　example；　it　is
observed　that　we　can　find　pleasure　in　the　mere　exercise　of　power；　in
the　consciousness　of　our　strength　of　mind　in　overing　obstacles
which　are　opposed　to　our　designs；　in　the　culture　of　our　mental
talents；　etc。；　and　we　justly　call　these　more　refined　pleasures　and
enjoyments；　because　they　are　more　in　our　power　than　others；　they　do
not　wear　out；　but　rather　increase　the　capacity　for　further　enjoyment
of　them；　and　while　they　delight　they　at　the　same　time　cultivate。　But
to　say　on　this　account　that　they　determine　the　will　in　a　different　way
and　not　through　sense；　whereas　the　possibility　of　the　pleasure
presupposes　a　feeling　for　it　implanted　in　us；　which　is　the　first
condition　of　this　satisfaction；　this　is　just　as　when　ignorant
persons　that　like　to　dabble　in　metaphysics　imagine　matter　so　subtle；
so　supersubtle　that　they　almost　make　themselves　giddy　with　it；　and
then　think　that　in　this　way　they　have　conceived　it　as　a　spiritual
and　yet　extended　being。　If　with　Epicurus　we　make　virtue　determine
the　will　only　by　means　of　the　pleasure　it　promises；　we　cannot
afterwards　blame　him　for　holding　that　this　pleasure　is　of　the　same
kind　as　those　of　the　coarsest　senses。　For　we　have　no　reason　whatever
to　charge　him　with　holding　that　the　ideas　by　which　this　feeling　is
excited　in　us　belong　merely　to　the　bodily　senses。　As　far　as　can　be
conjectured；　he　sought　the　source　of　many　of　them　in　the　use　of　the
higher　cognitive　faculty；　but　this　did　not　prevent　him；　and　could
not　prevent　him；　from　holding　on　the　principle　above　stated；　that
the　pleasure　itself　which　those　intellectual　ideas　give　us；　and　by
which　alone　they　can　determine　the　will；　is　just　of　the　same　kind。
Consistency　is　the　highest　obligation　of　a　philosopher；　and　yet　the
most　rarely　found。　The　ancient　Greek　schools　give　us　more　examples
of　it　than　we　find　in　our　syncretistic　age；　in　which　a　certain　shallow
and　dishonest　system　of　promise　of　contradictory　principles　is
devised；　because　it　mends　itself　better　to　a　public　which　is
content　to　know　something　of　everything　and　nothing　thoroughly；　so
as　to　please　every　party。
　　The　principle　of　private　happiness；　however　much　understanding　and
reason　may　be　used　in　it；　cannot　contain　any　other　determining
principles　for　the　will　than　those　which　belong　to　the　lower
desires；　and　either　there　are　no　＇higher＇　desires　at　all；　or　pure
reason　must　of　itself　alone　be　practical；　that　is；　it　must　be　able
to　determine　the　will　by　the　mere　form　of　the　practical　rule　without
supposing　any　feeling；　and　consequently　without　any　idea　of　the
pleasant　or　unpleasant；　which　is　the　matter　of　the　desire；　and　which
is　always　an　empirical　condition　of　the　principles。　Then　only；　when
reason　of　itself　determines　the　will　（not　as　the　servant　of　the
inclination）；　it　is　really　a　higher　desire　to　which　that　which　is