the+critique+of+practical+reason-第7部分

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Empirical　principles　of　determination　are　not　fit　for　any　universal
external　legislation；　but　just　as　little　for　internal；　for　each　man
makes　his　own　subject　the　foundation　of　his　inclination；　and　in　the
same　subject　sometimes　one　inclination；　sometimes　another；　has　the
preponderance。　To　discover　a　law　which　would　govern　them　all　under
this　condition；　namely；　bringing　them　all　into　harmony；　is　quite
impossible。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　V。　PROBLEM　I。

　　Supposing　that　the　mere　legislative　form　of　maxims　is　alone　the
sufficient　determining　principle　of　a　will；　to　find　the　nature　of
the　will　which　can　be　determined　by　it　alone。
　　　Since　the　bare　form　of　the　law　can　only　be　conceived　by　reason；　and
is；　therefore；　not　an　object　of　the　senses；　and　consequently　does
not　belong　to　the　class　of　phenomena；　it　follows　that　the　idea　of
it；　which　determines　the　will；　is　distinct　from　all　the　principles
that　determine　events　in　nature　according　to　the　law　of　causality；
because　in　their　case　the　determining　principles　must　themselves　be
phenomena。　Now；　if　no　other　determining　principle　can　serve　as　a　law
for　the　will　except　that　universal　legislative　form；　such　a　will
must　be　conceived　as　quite　independent　of　the　natural　law　of　phenomena
in　their　mutual　relation；　namely；　the　law　of　causality；　such
independence　is　called　freedom　in　the　strictest；　that　is；　in　the
transcendental；　sense；　consequently；　a　will　which　can　have　its　law
in　nothing　but　the　mere　legislative　form　of　the　maxim　is　a　free　will。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　VI。　PROBLEM　II。

　　Supposing　that　a　will　is　free；　to　find　the　law　which　alone　is
petent　to　determine　it　necessarily。
　　Since　the　matter　of　the　practical　law；　i。e。；　an　object　of　the　maxim；
can　never　be　given　otherwise　than　empirically；　and　the　free　will　is
independent　on　empirical　conditions　（that　is；　conditions　belonging
to　the　world　of　sense）　and　yet　is　determinable；　consequently　a　free
will　must　find　its　principle　of　determination　in　the　law；　and　yet
independently　of　the　matter　of　the　law。　But；　besides　the　matter　of　the
law；　nothing　is　contained　in　it　except　the　legislative　form。　It　is　the
legislative　form；　then；　contained　in　the　maxim；　which　can　alone
constitute　a　principle　of　determination　of　the　＇free＇　will。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Thus　freedom　and　an　unconditional　practical　law　reciprocally　imply
each　other。　Now　I　do　not　ask　here　whether　they　are　in　fact　distinct；
or　whether　an　unconditioned　law　is　not　rather　merely　the　consciousness
of　a　pure　practical　reason　and　the　latter　identical　with　the
positive　concept　of　freedom；　I　only　ask；　whence　begins　our　knowledge
of　the　unconditionally　practical；　whether　it　is　from　freedom　or　from
the　practical　law？　Now　it　cannot　begin　from　freedom；　for　of　this　we
cannot　be　immediately　conscious；　since　the　first　concept　of　it　is
negative；　nor　can　we　infer　it　from　experience；　for　experience　gives　us
the　knowledge　only　of　the　law　of　phenomena；　and　hence　of　the　mechanism
of　nature；　the　direct　opposite　of　freedom。　It　is　therefore　the　moral
law；　of　which　we　bee　directly　conscious　（as　soon　as　we　trace　for
ourselves　maxims　of　the　will）；　that　first　presents　itself　to　us；　and
leads　directly　to　the　concept　of　freedom；　inasmuch　as　reason
presents　it　as　a　principle　of　determination　not　to　be　outweighed　by
any　sensible　conditions；　nay；　wholly　independent　of　them。　But　how　is
the　consciousness；　of　that　moral　law　possible？　We　can　bee　conscious
of　pure　practical　laws　just　as　we　are　conscious　of　pure　theoretical
principles；　by　attending　to　the　necessity　with　which　reason　prescribes
them　and　to　the　elimination　of　all　empirical　conditions；　which　it
directs。　The　concept　of　a　pure　will　arises　out　of　the　former；　as
that　of　a　pure　understanding　arises　out　of　the　latter。　That　this　is
the　true　subordination　of　our　concepts；　and　that　it　is　morality　that
first　discovers　to　us　the　notion　of　freedom；　hence　that　it　is
practical　reason　which；　with　this　concept；　first　proposes　to
speculative　reason　the　most　insoluble　problem；　thereby　placing　it　in
the　greatest　perplexity；　is　evident　from　the　following
consideration：　Since　nothing　in　phenomena　can　be　explained　by　the
concept　of　freedom；　but　the　mechanism　of　nature　must　constitute　the
only　clue；　moreover；　when　pure　reason　tries　to　ascend　in　the　series　of
causes　to　the　unconditioned；　it　falls　into　an　antinomy　which　is
entangled　in　inprehensibilities　on　the　one　side　as　much　as　the
other；　whilst　the　latter　（namely；　mechanism）　is　at　least　useful　in　the
explanation　of　phenomena；　therefore　no　one　would　ever　have　been　so
rash　as　to　introduce　freedom　into　science；　had　not　the　moral　law；
and　with　it　practical　reason；　e　in　and　forced　this　notion　upon
us。　Experience；　however；　confirms　this　order　of　notions。　Suppose
some　one　asserts　of　his　lustful　appetite　that；　when　the　desired　object
and　the　opportunity　are　present；　it　is　quite　irresistible。　＇Ask
him＇…　if　a　gallows　were　erected　before　the　house　where　he　finds　this
opportunity；　in　order　that　he　should　be　hanged　thereon　immediately
after　the　gratification　of　his　lust；　whether　he　could　not　then　control
his　passion；　we　need　not　be　long　in　doubt　what　he　would　reply。　Ask
him；　however…　if　his　sovereign　ordered　him；　on　pain　of　the　same
immediate　execution；　to　bear　false　witness　against　an　honourable
man；　whom　the　prince　might　wish　to　destroy　under　a　plausible
pretext；　would　he　consider　it　possible　in　that　case　to　overe　his
love　of　life；　however　great　it　may　be。　He　would　perhaps　not　venture　to
affirm　whether　he　would　do　so　or　not；　but　he　must　unhesitatingly　admit
that　it　is　possible　to　do　so。　He　judges；　therefore；　that　he　can　do　a
certain　thing　because　he　is　conscious　that　he　ought；　and　he　recognizes
that　he　is　free…　a　fact　which　but　for　the　moral　law　he　would　never
have　known。

　　　　　　　　　VII。　FUNDAMENTAL　LAW　OF　THE　PURE　PRACTICAL　REASON。

　　Act　so　that　the　maxim　of　thy　will　can　always　at　the　same　time　hold
good　as　a　principle　of　universal　legislation。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Pure　geometry　has　postulates　which　are　practical　propositions；　but
contain　nothing　further　than　the　assumption　that　we　can　do　something
if　it　is　required　that　we　should　do　it；　and　these　are　the　only
geometrical　propositions　that　concern　actual　existence。　They　are；
then；　practical　rules　under　a　problematical　condition　of　the　will；　but
here　the　rule　says：　We　absolutely　must　proceed　in　a　certain　manner。
The　practical　rule　is；　therefore；　unconditional；　and　hence　it　is
conceived　a　priori　as　a　categorically　practical　proposition　by　which
the　will　is　objectively　determined　absolutely　and　immediately　（by
the　practical　rule　itself；　which　thus　is　in　this　case　a　law）；　for　pure
reason　practical　of　itself　is　here　directly　legislative。　The　will　is
thought　as　independent　on　empirical　conditions；　and；　therefore；　as
pure　will　determined　by　the　mere　form　of　the　law；　and　this　principle
of　determination　is　regarded　as　the　supreme　condition　of　all　maxims。
The　thing　is　strange　enough；　and　has　no　parallel　in　all　the　rest　of
our　practical　knowledge。　For　the　a　priori　thought　of　a　possible
universal　legislation　which　is　therefore　merely　problematical；　is
unconditionally　manded　as　a　law　without　borrowing　anything　from
experience　or　from　any　external　will。　This；　however；　is　not　a
precept　to　do　something　by　which　some　desired　effect　can　be　attained
（for　then　the　will　would　depend　on　physical　conditions）；　but　a　rule
that　determines　the　will　a　priori　only　so　far　as　regards　the　forms
of　its　maxims；　and　thus　it　is　at　least　not　impossible　to　conceive　that
a　law；　which　only　applies　to　the　subjective　form　of　principles；　yet
serves　as　a　principle　of　determination　by　means　of　the　objective
form　of　law　in　general。　We　may　call　the　consciousness　of　this
fundamental　law　a　fact　of　reason；　because　we　cannot　reason　it　out　from
antecedent　data　of　reason；　e。g。；　the　consciousness　of　freedom　（for
this　is　not　antecedently　given）；　but　it　forces　itself　on　us　as　a
synthetic　a　priori　proposition；　which　is　not　based　on　any　intuition；
either　pure　or　empirical。　It　would；　indeed；　be　analytical　if　the
freedom　of　the　will　were　presupposed；　but　to　presuppose　freedom　as　a
positive　concept　would　require　an　intellectual　intuition；　which　cannot
here　be　assumed；　however；　when　we　regard　this　law　as　given；　it　must　be
observed；　in　order　not　to　fall　into　any　misconception；　that　it　is
not　an　empirical　fact；　but　the　sole　fact　of　the　pure　reason；　which
thereby　announces　itself　as　originally　legislative　（sic　volo；　sic
jubeo）。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　COROLLARY。

　　Pure　reason　is　practical　of　itself　alone　and　gives　（to　man）　a
universal　law　which　we　call　the　moral　law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　The　fact　just　mentioned　is　undeniable。　It　is　only　necessary　to
analyse　the　judgement　that　men　pass　on　the　lawfulness　of　their
actions；　in　order　to　find　that；　whatever　inclination　may　say　to　the
contrary；　reason；　incorruptible　and　selfconstrained；　always
confronts　the　maxim　of　the　will　in　any　action　with　the　pure　will；　that
is；　with　itself；　considering　itself　as　a　priori　practical。　Now　this
principle　of　morality；　just　on　account　of　the　universality　of　the
legislation　which　make