马基雅维里 君主论英文prince-第4部分

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making　one　from　amongst　themselves；　and　they　do　not　know　how　to　govern

themselves。　For　this　reason　they　are　very　slow　to　take　up　arms；　and　a

prince　can　gain　them　to　himself　and　secure　them　much　more　easily。　But　in

republics　there　is　more　vitality；　greater　hatred；　and　more　desire　for

vengeance；　which　will　never　permit　them　to　allow　the　memory　of　their

former　liberty　to　rest；　so　that　the　safest　way　is　to　destroy　them　or　to

reside　there。



CHAPTER　VI



CONCERNING　NEW　PRINCIPALITIES　WHICH　ARE　ACQUIRED　BY　ONE'S　OWN　ARMS　AND

ABILITY



LET　no　one　be　surprised　if；　in　speaking　of　entirely　new　principalities

as　I　shall　do；　I　adduce　the　highest　examples　both　of　prince　and　of

state；　because　men；　walking　almost　always　in　paths　beaten　by　others；　and

following　by　imitation　their　deeds；　are　yet　unable　to　keep　entirely　to

the　ways　of　others　or　attain　to　the　power　of　those　they　imitate。　A　wise

man　ought　always　to　follow　the　paths　beaten　by　great　men；　and　to　imitate

those　who　have　been　supreme；　so　that　if　his　ability　does　not　equal

theirs；　at　least　it　will　savour　of　it。　Let　him　act　like　the　clever

archers　who；　designing　to　hit　the　mark　which　yet　appears　too　far

distant；　and　knowing　the　limits　to　which　the　strength　of　their　bow

attains；　take　aim　much　higher　than　the　mark；　not　to　reach　by　their

strength　or　arrow　to　so　great　a　height；　but　to　be　able　with　the　aid　of

so　high　an　aim　to　hit　the　mark　they　wish　to　reach。



I　say；　therefore；　that　in　entirely　new　principalities；　where　there　is　a

new　prince；　more　or　less　difficulty　is　found　in　keeping　them；

accordingly　as　there　is　more　or　less　ability　in　him　who　has　acquired　the

state。　Now；　as　the　fact　of　being　a　prince　from　a　private　station

presupposes　either　ability　or　fortune；　it　is　clear　that　one　or　other　of

these　two　things　will　mitigate　in　some　degree　many　difficulties。

Nevertheless；　he　who　has　relied　least　on　fortune　is　established　the

strongest。　Further；　it　facilitates　matters　when　the　prince；　having　no

other　state；　is　pelled　to　reside　there　in　person。



But　to　e　to　those　who；　by　their　own　ability　and　not　through　fortune；

have　risen　to　be　princes；　I　say　that　Moses；　Cyrus；　Romulus；　Theseus；　and

such　like　are　the　most　excellent　examples。　And　although　one　may　not

discuss　Moses；　he　having　been　a　mere　executor　of　the　will　of　God；　yet　he

ought　to　be　admired；　if　only　for　that　favour　which　made　him　worthy　to

speak　with　God。　But　in　considering　Cyrus　and　others　who　have　acquired　or

founded　kingdoms；　all　will　be　found　admirable；　and　if　their　particular

deeds　and　conduct　shall　be　considered；　they　will　not　be　found　inferior

to　those　of　Moses；　although　he　had　so　great　a　preceptor。　And　in

examining　their　actions　and　lives　one　cannot　see　that　they　owed　anything

to　fortune　beyond　opportunity；　which　brought　them　the　material　to　mould

into　the　form　which　seemed　best　to　them。　Without　that　opportunity　their

powers　of　mind　would　have　been　extinguished；　and　without　those　powers

the　opportunity　would　have　e　in　vain。



It　was　necessary；　therefore；　to　Moses　that　he　should　find　the　people　of

Israel　in　Egypt　enslaved　and　oppressed　by　the　Egyptians；　in　order　that

they　should　be　disposed　to　follow　him　so　as　to　be　delivered　out　of

bondage。　It　was　necessary　that　Romulus　should　not　remain　in　Alba；　and

that　he　should　be　abandoned　at　his　birth；　in　order　that　he　should　bee

King　of　Rome　and　founder　of　the　fatherland。　It　was　necessary　that　Cyrus

should　find　the　Persians　discontented　with　the　government　of　the　Medes；

and　the　Medes　soft　and　effeminate　through　their　long　peace。　Theseus

could　not　have　shown　his　ability　had　he　not　found　the　Athenians

dispersed。　These　opportunities；　therefore；　made　those　men　fortunate；　and

their　high　ability　enabled　them　to　recognize　the　opportunity　whereby

their　country　was　ennobled　and　made　famous。



Those　who　by　valorous　ways　bee　princes；　like　these　men；　acquire　a

principality　with　difficulty；　but　they　it　with　ease。　The　difficulties

they　have　in　acquiring　it　arise　in　part　from　the　new　rules　and　methods

which　they　are　forced　to　introduce　to　establish　their　government　and　its

security。　And　it　ought　to　be　remembered　that　there　is　nothing　more

difficult　to　take　in　hand；　more　perilous　to　conduct；　or　more　uncertain

in　its　success；　than　to　take　the　lead　in　the　introduction　of　a　new　order

of　things。　Because　the　innovator　has　for　enemies　all　those　who　have　done

well　under　the　old　conditions；　and　lukewarm　defenders　in　those　who　may

do　well　under　the　new。　This　coolness　arises　partly　from　fear　of　the

opponents；　who　have　the　laws　on　their　side；　and　partly　from　the

incredulity　of　men；　who　do　not　readily　believe　in　new　things　until　they

have　had　a　long　experience　of　them。　Thus　it　happens　that　whenever　those

who　are　hostile　have　the　opportunity　to　attack　they　do　it　like

partisans；　whilst　the　others　defend　lukewarmly；　in　such　wise　that　the

prince　is　endangered　along　with　them。



It　is　necessary；　therefore；　if　we　desire　to　discuss　this　matter

thoroughly；　to　inquire　whether　these　innovators　can　rely　on　themselves

or　have　to　depend　on　others：　that　is　to　say；　whether；　to　consummate

their　enterprise；　have　they　to　use　prayers　or　can　they　use　force？　In　the

first　instance　they　always　succeed　badly；　and　never　pass　anything；

but　when　they　can　rely　on　themselves　and　use　force；　then　they　are　rarely

endangered。　Hence　it　is　that　all　armed　prophets　have　conquered；　and　the

unarmed　ones　have　been　destroyed。　Besides　the　reasons　mentioned；　the

nature　of　the　people　is　variable；　and　whilst　it　is　easy　to　persuade

them；　it　is　difficult　to　fix　them　in　that　persuasion。　And　thus　it　is

necessary　to　take　such　measures　that；　when　they　believe　no　longer；　it

may　be　possible　to　make　them　believe　by　force。



If　Moses；　Cyrus；　Theseus；　and　Romulus　had　been　unarmed　they　could　not

have　enforced　their　constitutions　for　long　　as　happened　in　our　time　to

Fra　Girolamo　Savonarola；　who　was　ruined　with　his　new　order　of　things

immediately　the　multitude　believed　in　him　no　longer；　and　he　had　no　means

of　keeping　steadfast　those　who　believed　or　of　making　the　unbelievers　to

believe。　Therefore　such　as　these　have　great　difficulties　in　consummating

their　enterprise；　for　all　their　dangers　are　in　the　ascent；　yet　with

ability　they　will　overe　them；　but　when　these　are　overe；　and　those

who　envied　them　their　success　are　exterminated；　they　will　begin　to　be

respected；　and　they　will　continue　afterwards　powerful；　secure；　honoured；

and　happy。



To　these　great　examples　I　wish　to　add　a　lesser　one；　still　it　bears　some

resemblance　to　them；　and　I　wish　it　to　suffice　me　for　all　of　a　like　kind：

it　is　Hiero　the　Syracusan。　This　man　rose　from　a　private　station　to　be

Prince　of　Syracuse；　nor　did　he；　either；　owe　anything　to　fortune　but

opportunity；　for　the　Syracusans；　being　oppressed；　chose　him　for　their

captain；　afterwards　he　was　rewarded　by　being　made　their　prince。　He　was

of　so　great　ability；　even　as　a　private　citizen；　that　one　who　writes　of

him　says　he　wanted　nothing　but　a　kingdom　to　be　a　king。　This　man

abolished　the　old　soldiery；　organized　the　new；　gave　up　old　alliances；

made　new　ones；　and　as　he　had　his　own　soldiers　and　allies；　on　such

foundations　he　was　able　to　build　any　edifice：　thus；　whilst　he　had

endured　much　trouble　in　acquiring；　he　had　but　little　in　keeping。



CHAPTER　VII



CONCERNING　NEW　PRINCIPALITIES　WHICH　ARE　ACQUIRED　EITHER　BY　THE　ARMS　OF

OTHERS　OR　BY　GOOD　FORTUNE



THOSE　who　solely　by　good　fortune　bee　princes　from　being　private

citizens　have　little　trouble　in　rising；　but　much　in　keeping　atop；　they

have　not　any　difficulties　on　the　way　up；　because　they　fly；　but　they　have

many　when　they　reach　the　summit。　Such　are　those　to　whom　some　state　is

given　either　for　money　or　by　the　favour　of　him　who　bestows　it；　as

happened　to　many　in　Greece；　in　the　cities　of　Ionia　and　of　the

Hellespont；　where　princes　were　made　by　Darius；　in　order　that　they　might

hold　the　cities　both　for　his　security　and　his　glory；　as　also　were　those

emperors　who；　by　the　corruption　of　the　soldiers；　from　being　citizens

came　to　empire。　Such　stand　simply　upon　the　goodwill　and　the　fortune　of

him　who　has　elevated　them　　two　most　inconstant　and　unstable　things。

Neither　have　they　the　knowledge　requisite　for　the　position；　because；

unless　they　are　men　of　great　worth　and　ability；　it　is　not　reasonable　to

expect　that　they　should　know　how　to　mand；　having　always　lived　in　a

private　condition；　besides；　they　cannot　hold　it　because　they　have　not

forces　which　they　can　keep　friendly　and　faithful。



States　that　rise　unexpectedly；　then；　like　all　other　things　in　nature

which　are　born　and　grow　rapidly；　cannot　have　their　foundations　and

relations　with　other　states　fixed　in　such　a　way　that　the　first　storm

will　not　overthrow　them；　unless；　as　is　said；　those　who　unexpectedly

bee　princes　are　men　of　so　much　ability　that　they　know　they　have　to　be

prepared　at　once　to　hold　that　which　fortune　has　thrown　into　their　laps；

and　that　those　foundations；　which